A ‘Controlled Freeze’ in Gaza -- 'There was never going to be a Phase Two'
A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations in West Asia -- analysis & reports from the Arabic/ regional press & other sources (26 Nov 2025)
STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES & CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS —
There was never going to be a Phase Two for Gaza; The Ceasefire was the strategy (The Cradle):
Tel Aviv’s intent was never to advance to a second phase, but to extract what it could, then stall, shift the goalposts, and reassert control through other means. The ceasefire, brokered under the guise of relief, was engineered by Tel Aviv and Washington as a tool to restore their grip – not just on Gaza, but on the broader terms of war and peace in West Asia … The central question is not why the second phase is delayed. It is: who is delaying it, to what end, and within what political architecture is this process being managed? … To answer that is to look beyond the headlines and into the power corridors that stretch from the Israeli war cabinet to Washington’s national security apparatus, from the divisions within the Israeli military to the red lines drawn by the Palestinian resistance around international trusteeship schemes …
The US, having orchestrated the ceasefire, now faces a dilemma. It wants the war to end to avoid regional collapse and repair its global standing. But it cannot force Israel into full withdrawal without triggering a political backlash at home and further destabilizing the region. The result is a controlled freeze …
So, was the second phase delayed – or obstructed? … [Senior Resistance officials have said that], the second phase, far from mere negotiations, will shape the future of Gaza, the occupied West Bank, the Palestinian Authority (PA), the resistance, and the regional order. That is why Israel and its allies are stalling. They want to ensure that when the second phase begins, it does not return the resistance to a position of initiative, nor collapse the Israeli government. They seek to block any path toward Palestinian unity ... to prevent the reopening of a viable statehood track, to maintain the separation between Gaza and the occupied West Bank, and to preserve their grip over the crossings, the reconstruction agenda, and the broader political narrative … In [the] gap between full compliance and full evasion, one of the most consequential chapters in the Palestinian struggle is unfolding … [and] the question remains: Can Israel postpone the inevitable forever, or will the political momentum forged through Resistance on the battlefield impose itself on the negotiating table too?
Hamas & the Resistance upheld the deal; Israel broke it (The Cradle):
Senior Hamas official Abdel Majid al-Awad [has] laid out a straightforward but damning account: the Resistance fully honored its obligations in the first phase (the release of all living captives in a single batch, and the continued handover of bodies despite logistical complexities). On the other side, there was no such commitment. Daily violations of the ceasefire, the relentless destruction of infrastructure, and the targeted killing of civilians represent a continuation of Israel’s well-established pattern of delay and evasion under the guise of “security considerations.” This is the context in which the second phase now hangs … According to [a] senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad official, the Resistance has not signed off on any post-conflict political arrangements. The only agreement signed was the first phase. Everything else, including discussions on governance and security in Gaza, was deferred to a future intra-Palestinian consensus. Disarmament is not on the table. It will only be discussed once the occupation ends. That truth collapses the myth – widely circulated in Israeli media – that the resistance has implicitly accepted phase two. It has not. It has held the line that any political future for Gaza must be decided collectively by Palestinians, not imposed by foreign powers.
A Ceasefire That Is Not a Ceasefire (KHAMENEI.IR, online publication from Iran’s Supreme Leader):
On Sunday, senior Hezbollah commander Haytham Ali Tabatabai was assassinated and martyred, along with several of his comrades, during an Israeli airstrike on the southern suburb of Beirut. Martyr Tabatabai was one of Hezbollah’s most prominent field commanders. He belonged to the second generation of Hezbollah’s founders was commander of the elite [and] Unit. Due to his role in the command structure of the Resistance, his assassination has become one of the most significant security events in Lebanon … The main message lies in the timing, location, and method of the operation … For Tel Aviv, ceasefire periods—whether in Gaza or Lebanon—are part of an intelligence and operational cycle whose effectiveness has been proven for years. Analysis of field data shows that during the ceasefire after the Gaza war, and following the recent clashes in Lebanon, Israel has carried out extensive intelligence activities. The relative reduction in combat intensity, the temporary psychological calm, and the limitation of offensive actions create the impression that the threat has decreased—yet for Israeli intelligence services, this is the best opportunity to update their target bank, monitor movement patterns, assess security coverage, and correct operational coordinates. The assassination of Haytham Ali Tabatabai is precisely the outcome of such a process …
In Tel Aviv’s view, a ceasefire is not the end of conflict, but rather a change in the stage and method of confrontation. Therefore, expecting Israel to adhere to a ceasefire is a clear miscalculation. The lessons from this operation are evident for security and military institutions in the region: Experience shows that Israel gains its greatest intelligence advantage during ceasefires … The close cooperation between the United States and Israel during ceasefire management indicates that these periods are designed under special political and security frameworks, and cannot be regarded as neutral or impartial processes. Under such conditions, continuous vigilance for security and military institutions is a strategic necessity. This vigilance does not necessarily mean escalating tension at all times—it requires maintaining stable monitoring, periodic revision of protective protocols, strengthening communication security, and giving special attention to Israel’s field behavior patterns.
“Organised Chaos”: Israel’s Strategy to Break Gaza Society from Within (Al-Akhbar):
“Organized chaos” has become the hallmark of modern warfare ... Gaza’s experience illustrat[es] this “shadow war,” a campaign waged to dismantle society from within, when military force fails to achieve victory … Through tactics known as “social dynamics engineering”, Occupation forces amplified tribal rivalries, recruited collaborators, and undermined local institutions. While rockets targeted the Strip, Israeli intelligence operated covertly to build local networks charged with monitoring resistance fighters; … Israel also weaponized Gaza’s economic collapse; in displacement camps, fights [escalated] into armed clashes. What began as disorder soon became daily life. The Occupation’s strategy extended into manipulating Gaza’s aid system. New “charitable” organizations emerged as fronts for groups coordinating with Israel. Vulnerable traders and clan leaders, particularly those tied to the Ramallah authority, were co-opted through financial incentives …
[In Gaza, five armed proxy gangs are operating against Hamas, each operating in a specific area] … Husam al-Astal, a former Preventive Security officer and long-time collaborator, announced in September 2025 the formation of the Counter-Terrorism Strike Force—a 150-member militia claiming to “liberate Gaza from Hamas rule”. He admitted receiving Arab and Western support, “in partial coordination” with Israel … Other gangs soon followed. In Gaza City’s Sabra neighborhood, Motaz Doghmush, of the family that founded the Army of Islam, re-armed his faction … In eastern Gaza, Rami Hellis, a Fatah member and former Presidential Security officer, ran a gang under direct coordination with Israeli intelligence officer ‘Abu Rami’ … Similar cells appeared in Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia. In Shujaiya, Hamas dismantled a cell led by Ahmad Jundiyeh, who surrendered after the execution of several collaborators. In Khan Younis, Resistance forces raided the “Al-Mujaida” gang, which had stolen $15 million in aid to buy weapons. Israeli warplanes struck during the operation, killing 20 resistance fighters …
Although the ceasefire and Hamas’s redeployment brought partial calm, [Israel] continues its model of chaos ... weaponized as policy. Yet Gaza’s society, scarred but unbroken, continues to rebuild from within, forging new networks of solidarity that resist the transformation of hunger into betrayal and disorder into strategy.
Can Israel adapt from setting the rules to being one of a number of strategic partners in a broader regional project? (Yahya Dbouk, Al-Akhbar):
A shift is indeed underway, albeit still relative, as both Washington and Riyadh work to reshape the regional security architecture, or at least parts of it, according to their shared objectives. This is a trajectory that Tel Aviv—which no longer unilaterally dictates regional developments—should have anticipated … Israel is no longer able, as it once was, to impose its will on either its enemies or its allies … The political division within the entity is wider and deeper, and the governing coalition is threatened internally … Moreover, Israel has ended its recent wars, without actually ending them, while still insisting on a narrative of “victory” that has no basis in reality. Hamas has not been completely defeated, and a vision for the “day after” in Gaza, as Tel Aviv desires, has not been established. Although normalization with Saudi Arabia has been frozen, the latter is reaping strategic benefits from it, while the Iranian threat has been postponed without being fundamentally addressed. Perhaps most importantly, Israel is no longer able, as it once was, to impose its will on either its enemies or its allies, foremost among them its American patron. This contributes to the exaggeration of the perceived threat it faces …
The US, as always, views the region and the world through the lens of its own interests. If these interests diverge from Israel’s assessment, the US works to mitigate the contradiction, not resolve it solely in Tel Aviv’s favour … Trump prioritizes immediate dramatic achievements over long-term results. What matters to [him] (besides the general American interest) is not what the situation will be like in 10 years, but what can be announced tomorrow at a press conference. Within this logic, selling fighter jets to a major strategic ally like Saudi Arabia seems like a “profitable deal,” even if it provokes Israeli discontent. However, the real threat to Israel doesn’t lie in Washington selling aircraft to Riyadh, but rather in Tel Aviv’s continued belief that the world will stop turning if it isn’t consulted on every deal, and if its opinion isn’t followed afterward. But reality dictates that the world is changing; and if Israel wants to keep pace with this change, it must adapt to the fact that it is transforming from a “state” that sets the terms to a strategic partner in a broader regional project that includes many partners, of which it is but one.
Tehran eyes strategic alliance with Pakistan & Saudi that would reshape regional power dynamics (Al Mayadeen)
Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Ali Larijani’s visit to Pakistan marks a significant turning point in regional geopolitics, sources told Al Mayadeen. The visit is seen as laying the groundwork for a strategic alliance between Tehran and Islamabad, one that moves beyond the limits of traditional bilateral cooperation. According to sources, Tehran views the visit as a practical step toward redrawing the balance of power in both South Asia and West Asia ... in light of efforts by external powers to impose new realities on the region’s security architecture. Iran considers this strategic engagement crucial in countering regional threats and in asserting a collective security framework free from foreign interference … Tehran has expressed readiness to contribute to collective defense cooperation, including direct coordination with both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Iranian officials consider such cooperation as an essential path toward securing the region, independent of US pressure or intervention. In this context, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf stated earlier in November that Tehran is open to joining the recently signed defense agreement between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia … Ghalibaf urged member states of the OIC to consider establishing a joint military force similar to NATO.
MbS crowned his consolidation of power at the White House (Al-Akhbar):
Mohammed bin Salman set foot in the White House a far more powerful man than seven years ago, when he was still new to the throne’s inner circle, fumbling his way through foreign-policy gambles. In this visit, he sought to crown his consolidation of power at home, where he has eliminated rivals within the royal family and now rules with an authority unmatched even by his grandfather, the Kingdom’s founder. The primary promise of the visit was clear: MBS pledged to raise Saudi investments in the US from the already-massive $600 billion he promised Trump in May to a staggering $1 trillion. Trump, who has always treated foreign policy as a branch of real-estate marketing, celebrated the announcement as if it were a personal triumph … Essentially, the ‘Trump people’ bound to these deals will remain close to the president long after he leaves office, and that, for him, is what matters most. The major takeaway, therefore, of the MBS’s jovial welcome, is that money still talks, loudly and with perfect articulation.
The second order of business was one that raised fear in Israeli circles. As Trump formalized his decision to sell Saudi Arabia F-35 fighter jets, anxious Israeli voices, concerned with maintaining the qualitative military edge in the region, started presenting explicit objections to the potential deal ... Israel’s real threat does not come from Washington selling fighter jets to Riyadh, but rather from Tel Aviv’s belief that the world will simply stop spinning if Israel is not consulted on every deal. The grim reality is that Israel, with its deep internal divisions and attempts at offering a fragile narrative of regional victory, is becoming one player among many in Trump’s bigger project … The final major order of business of the visit was the Abraham Accords … [On this], the prince responded [to Trump] that Riyadh wants to be part of the agreements, “but we want also to be sure that we secure a clear path of two-state solution” … [However] if we trace months of Trump statements and Saudi foreign policy behavior, we can assert that this MBS visit, billed by his supporters as a historic turning point, will not change much, neither regionally nor on the global stage. Yet the visit remains highly significant for both the crown prince and his host, marking a pivotal moment in the history of US-Saudi relations. The equation is simple: Trump wants money, and bin Salman has it, and this creates the perfect conditions for deals designed to serve the ambitions of both men.
‘There is no deterrence or resistance to Israel incursions into south Syria’ (The Cradle):
Israeli forces have carried out nearly 60 incursions into southern Syria in November so far, involving heavy shelling, arrests of civilians and combatants, the establishment of military checkpoints, and the bulldozing of roads and farmlands, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported on 22 November. SOHR noted “the absence of any deterrent” on the part of the Syrian government to “stop this escalation, reflecting the growing security challenges along the country’s southern border.”
‘Israel is illegally annexing southern Lebanon, ‘redrawing borders with bulldozers and blood’ (from a regional source):
"What is happening today in southern Lebanon is not just another border skirmish, nor a “security operation” as Israeli officials cynically claim. It is an active, illegal annexation. The IDF, backed by extremist settler organizations and private military contractors, are redrawing Lebanon’s borders with concrete, bulldozers, and blood. Israeli bulldozers roar day and night, carving out a massive fortified wall that snakes deep into Lebanese land. This is not merely a fence — it is a monument of colonial theft, a structure meant to erase Lebanon’s sovereignty under the guise of “security.” Behind this monstrous barrier lies another inner wall and layers of cement and soil fortifications meticulously engineered over the years to permanently seize Lebanese territory. This isn’t the work of the Israeli military alone. The construction is being carried out by Israeli settler companies — private civilian contractors funded and supported by far-right extremist groups. Among them the notorious ‘Uri Tzafon Movement’ whose open mission is to settle southern Lebanon as “biblical land.” Since mid-2024, ‘Uri Tzafon’ has been actively building and selling properties on Lebanese soil, openly violating international borders as the world looks away. One of the key contractors in this criminal enterprise is Bardarian Brothers, a company long linked to Israeli Ministry of Defense contracts. In 2024 and 2025, Bardarian Brothers and similar companies expanded their operations into southern Lebanon — this time to entrench their occupation. that has no legal, moral, or historical justification. In a shocking development, Israeli real estate agencies have begun advertising and selling land parcels in southern Lebanon and Gaza — online, in plain sight. Reports by Roya News (2024) and BBC (2025) reveal how Israeli extremists and speculators are marketing occupied land as “new investment opportunities” … This is not a security buffer. This is not a border adjustment. This is the deliberate, systematic annexation of another nation’s territory, enforced by the military, blessed by extremist rabbis, and financed by private companies complicit in occupation.



Has Lebanon completely abandoned its border with Israel? If the State isn't interested in defending its own border, what do they think will happen? I'm sure things are more complicated geographically than that, but still.