As their hegemony project falters, Israel-US are fanning mini wars
A compilation tracking consequential observations -- Analysis & reports from regional commentators, 26 May 2026
MbZ gambles with UAE’s future; stakes everything on Israel & US /
‘Abraham Accords are an Emirati-controlled structure; Saudi Arabia will never join’ /
‘Current normalisation talk far removed from regional realities; Saudi-Iranian accommodation far more likely’ /
‘Pushing Beirut into an armed conflict with Hezbollah is insane’ /
President Aoun and PM Nawaf Salam prevent any solution that gives the Resistance leverage /
Lebanon FM tells the Vatican: ‘We want a “Little Lebanon”; Downplays secession of south Lebanon to Israel’
CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS —
The End of Israel’s Hegemony Project (Hussein Ibrahim, Al-Akhbar):
With a memorandum of understanding between Iran and the US nearing completion, the entire region is preparing to enter a new era, different from that which it has experienced since the Islamic Revolution in Iran … Although it is difficult to predict at this stage what form the regional order will take following the agreement, and what roles the states concerned will play within it, it is certain that this order will reflect the balance of power existing at the moment the memorandum of understanding is signed … Fundamentally America and Israel have failed to achieve the war’s objectives by force. And because these objectives are, at their core, Israeli, Tel Aviv will be the primary loser in the agreement, whilst Washington may emerge with economic gains from the projects to be launched after the war, particularly in the Iranian energy sector … Israel’s loss [will be the] end to its ambition to dominate the Middle East, [preventing it] establish[ing] a security system under its umbrella, and prevent[ing] it from threatening Middle Eastern states with American force … There are rulers of major oil-producing Gulf states, and vast economic sectors in America and beyond, who have been harmed by the continuation of the war, foremost among them the major US oil companies that control Gulf oil. The agreement may allow them to expand into Iran’s oil and gas ...
[But, it is] inaccurate to attempt to portray the new era in the region as one of Iranian domination over the Gulf. However, it is only natural that Iran, having been freed from the embargo and wars, should play a greater role in restructuring the region’s security system, just as it is natural for relations between it and its Gulf neighbours to become positive, except with those who continue to back renewed Israeli attempts to target Tehran in one way or another – a position Abu Dhabi adopted during the recent war. The UAE will have to accept that it is on the losing side in this war; and that its inflated negative role in regional issues may be scaled back …
Bin Zayed gambles with the UAE’s future; stakes everything on Israel & US (Hussein Ibrahim, Al-Akhbar):
It appears that Mohammed bin Zayed has decided to go all the way in defending his regime and influence, staking everything, almost openly, on Israel and the US, without any regard for the risks this may entail for the regime and the state, which have, in turn, become clear and tangible. However, this gamble is not new; indeed, the gradual nature of his approach suggests that bin Zayed has been preparing for it for many years. For the Emirati president, the US-Israeli war on Iran was inevitable, if not today then tomorrow … His withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ … only serves to underline this uniqueness. The decision forms part of the state’s preparations for a war economy; it allows it to almost double oil production, which may enable it to offset the losses that will be inflicted on the UAE’s economy – and on the Dubai model in particular, which is based on its status as a regional commercial and financial hub, a model that cannot be sustained in times of war …
This option allows bin Zayed to tighten his grip on the UAE itself; the fear currently gripping him extends [too] to encompass the future of the state that his father unified in 1971 as well, particularly at a time when a redrawing of maps has become a strong possibility. The Emirates, which were known as the ‘Emirates of the Trucial Coast’ before becoming the United Arab Emirates, have a name that points to two fundamental dangers facing them: firstly, the seven emirates that make up the state were constantly at odds with one another before the West helped Zayed to unify them by bringing the ruling families under his authority, after they had agreed with him on the identity of the state and his interests therein; the second is that they belong to a geographical region with a historical name: Oman. Therefore, Zayed’s sons, just as their father did, have a particular sensitivity towards the Sultanate of Oman and border disputes with it, just as the state also has border disputes with Saudi Arabia, upon which a mountain of conflicts has accumulated, from geography to role to stakes, and conflicts are erupting between them from Yemen to Sudan and the Horn of Africa, right through to relations with Israel, which must inevitably be with one at the expense of the other ...
On his way to his new goal, it seems that bin Zayed has decided to sacrifice the Dubai model, which is incompatible with involvement in wars. This would place the emirate – the only one among the six other emirates with a viable alternative to Abu Dhabi in peacetime – in a position of dependence on the latter, which holds the bulk of the oil reserves, and bring it more firmly under Bin Zayed’s control. Thus, given the state of anxiety he is experiencing, Bin Zayed has become more willing to go to extremes in pursuing Israeli and American options, despite their risks and high costs. This is what has effectively drawn him into the war against Iran … During the aggression, he hosted in Abu Dhabi leaders of the Israeli security services, including the Chief of Staff of the Army, and subsequently Netanyahu, and he also utilised the Israeli ‘Iron Dome’ system to counter Iranian missiles and drones. Indeed, he has become even more vulnerable to American and Israeli manipulation … However, the major risks inherent in the choice to become embroiled in war – risks of which Bin Zayed is well aware – were highlighted in a report by Bloomberg, which spoke of unprecedented frustration within the Al-Shati Palace in Abu Dhabi following the Gulf states’ rejection of the idea of a collective military response against Iran, a move that prompted the Emirati president to go it alone on this course of action ...
UAE must abandon illusion of strategic exceptionalism (Andreas Krieg, Middle East Eye):
The UAE has spent two decades trying to escape the ordinary fate of small states through the network power of hyper-connectivity. It built ports, bought influence, cultivated militias, courted Washington, hedged with Moscow and Beijing, and projected the image of a country too nimble, too wealthy to be cornered by geography … [However its] accumulated levers of influence have not translated into strategic autonomy when confronted by the coercive power of an unrestrained Iran. The load-bearing assumption that network power can substitute for strategic depth has shown its limits ... The model was clever, often effective, and at times ruthless. It allowed Abu Dhabi to insert itself into conflicts, markets and diplomatic bargains, while maintaining the aura of a state that shapes events rather than suffers them. But power through networks does not translate into the power of outcomes in the Gulf. When the IRGC decided to escalate, the UAE’s impressive portfolio offered little coercive value … Moscow did not come to Abu Dhabi’s defence. Beijing issued the familiar language of concern and stability. Washington reassured, but delivered very little in terms of deterrence … It remains a prisoner of geography. Its ports sit on the wrong side of Iran’s missile and drone envelope. Its wealth depends on confidence, connectivity and uninterrupted flows. Its economy is a target precisely because it is open, visible and globally networked …
The war has shown that the UAE is exposed to the same regional pressures as every other small Gulf state … The instinct in Abu Dhabi will be to double down in the information environment. There will be more lobbying in Washington, more strategic messaging in western capitals, more curated narratives about Emirati resilience and exceptionalism … [However] the only viable route to Emirati security runs through a regional security complex ... Israeli opportunism to provide operational support ... cannot compensate for the UAE’s geographic proximity within a shared Gulf security complex … The UAE’s future security will not be secured by louder narratives of exceptionalism, nor by the fantasy that Little Sparta can stand apart from the Gulf’s collective fate. It will be secured, if at all, by a sober recognition that all Gulf states live under the same shadow ...
Andreas Krieg: ‘The Abraham Accords are an Emirati-controlled structure; Saudi Arabia will never join’:
The Abraham Accords were a way of creating a potentially multilateral framework that the Emiratis control. [This is] one reason why the Saudis will never join the Abraham Accords. They might normalize with Israel, but they will never join the Abraham Accords because they are ultimately an Emirati[-controlled] entity and the [Saudis] would be subservient to the Emiratis.
Danny Citrinowicz: ‘Current normalization talk far removed from regional realities; Saudi-Iranian accommodation far more likely’:
There needs to be an end to the false expectations surrounding Israeli-Saudi normalization. Let’s start with the semantic issue -- if normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia ever happens, it will not be branded as an extension of the “Abraham Accords” … Riyadh will insist on its own framework, its own terms, and its own political narrative. But that is the smaller issue. To understand just how detached current normalization talk is from regional realities, it is worth reading the recent arguments made by Prince Turki al-Faisal and other influential Saudi voices. In essence, the prevailing Saudi view today is that Israel has become a major source of regional instability, in some respects viewed as even more destabilizing than Iran … The reality is that renewed Saudi-Iranian accommodation is far more likely in the near term than Saudi-Israeli normalization … [A reality that] reflects the region as it actually exists, not as some policymakers wish it to be … This is also why comprehensive peace agreements between Israel and countries like Lebanon or Syria remain highly unlikely under current conditions. Much of the regional diplomatic architecture ultimately runs through Riyadh, and Saudi Arabia is not prepared to legitimize a regional order that sidelines Palestinian aspirations … At some point, Israeli policymakers and the public alike will have to confront a basic fact: normalization with the Arab world, especially with Saudi Arabia, will almost certainly require meaningful movement on the Palestinian track. Not symbolic gestures, but substantive political steps.
President Aoun and PM Nawaf Salam don’t want any solution that gives the Resistance any leverage (Ibrahim Al-Amin, Al-Akhbar):
President Aoun and his aide for government affairs, Nawaf Salam … do not want any solution that gives the resistance any credit. They neither appreciate the sacrifices of the resistance fighters nor the burden of war borne by the people; they are in a position of hating to the point of death anyone connected to the resistance, whether in thought or in the liberation movement. It is therefore not surprising that they do everything to obstruct any attempt to end the war and bring about the enemy’s withdrawal … Aoun and Salam are now facing a psychological state identical to that of Netanyahu. They reject any agreement with Iran that has anything to do with Lebanon. And they are betting – yes, betting – that Israel will reject America’s request to stop the war against Lebanon … Aoun and his government aide Salam have not stopped for a moment from reaching out across the globe to ensure that the Iran-US agreement does not include Lebanon; they are asking Washington to postpone the move, even if only for a week, and to make the cessation of hostilities the outcome of the security track meetings on 29 May and the political session on 2 June … What Aoun does not say is explained by his adviser Jean Aziz, who tells politicians and journalists: “What we are working on in the negotiations is to reach a ceasefire, followed by withdrawal, the release of prisoners, the deployment of the Lebanese Army and the return of the displaced, after which there will be an agreement with Israel on the demarcation of the land border.” [Presidential adviser] Aziz is quick to add that this process “requires a Lebanese commitment to disarming Hezbollah; and if the party insists on not going along with this, and ties its fate to developments on the Iranian front, it must expect a more intense Israeli war, and Israel will expand its occupation across the entire south as far as the Awali River, and will destroy every village and town it enters.” Aziz continues: “Even Western envoys are telling us that there are those in the Israeli Knesset who are considering passing a law to annex part of southern Lebanon to the State of Israel, and just as happened with the Golan Heights, Trump will recognise this move” …
When presented with information – from the American side – regarding Iran’s role and stance on the war in Lebanon, [Aoun] protested: “I have no objection to Iran playing a role in bringing the war to an end. But this must be done on Lebanon’s terms. This means that Iran must agree that ending the war is a prelude to a programme of action aimed at lifting the cover from Hezbollah, ceasing support for it, and not obstructing the process of its disarmament” … [Aoun continued]: “… there will be a state fund to finance the reconstruction process. I will not agree to Iran paying money to Hezbollah, even if that leads to reconstruction being blocked and no building taking place.” Aoun added: “I have heard from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and even France that they are prepared to take on the task of reconstruction, but their condition is clear: disarmament.” On this point, Aoun goes further than the American and Israeli conditions in linking the people’s right to reconstruction to disarmament… [Aoun] no longer hides his stance on the very idea of peace and normalisation with Israel. He states openly: ‘Lebanon cannot remain captive to a religious ideology belonging to a particular faction. Israel is a state that exists; it is a member of the United Nations, maintains relations with the entire world ... and today has relations with all Arab states, whether openly or in secret. We are a country that wants peace and believes in it, and all Arabs are with us in this approach’.
Ibrahim Al-Amine: President Aoun is going to great lengths to confront the Resistance even if it means plunging the country into a political, social and perhaps even security disaster:
Whilst he does not oppose the principle of a full peace agreement with Israel, [Aoun] knows that current circumstances do not allow him to realise this dream without securing tangible gains that can be marketed as victories the Resistance failed to achieve. This is the source of his concern regarding what might emerge from any agreement between the US and Iran. Aoun has heard from the Americans themselves that the Lebanon issue is not entirely separate from the Iranian issue, but he has agreed to proceed with a plan of action that would make any cessation of the war in Lebanon (even if part of a potential agreement between Iran and the US) a component of the negotiations he is leading with Israel. In this regard, he is not merely denying the facts or being obstinate, but is pushing matters towards further missteps. For he knows that should Washington decide to compel Israel to a complete cessation of military operations in Lebanon, it would do so in order to secure an agreement with Iran. At that point, Lebanon could secure a ceasefire without having to pay any price in return. However, Israel, which does not want an agreement with Iran and does not want to link the Lebanese front to the Iranian front, is also seeking to ensure that any such move is carried out in a way that allows it to extract concessions from Lebanon. It has therefore hastened to put forward a draft ‘Declaration of Intent’, whose central aim is to reach a peace agreement. According to the draft, this forms the basis for security and political cooperation in Lebanon, extending not only to the disarmament of the resistance across the whole of Lebanon, but also to establishing a framework for the future of the southern region, with conditions upon conditions for the reconstruction project and the return of residents to their homes …
Pushing Beirut into an Armed Conflict With Hezbollah Is Insane (Michael Young, Carnegie Middle East):
In an interview with Fox News, US Secretary of State Rubio spoke about Hezbollah’s disarmament. He remarked, “[W]hat we’re working toward establishing, is a system that actually works where vetted units within the Lebanese armed forces have the training, the equipment, and the capability to go after elements of Hezbollah and dismantle them so Israel doesn’t have to do it.” Rubio was mentioning a U.S. idea to train the army to potentially engage in military operations against a component of Lebanese society … facilitating a process that could morph into civil conflict.
However, Rubio’s remarks also raised a more fundamental question: What does disarming Hezbollah actually entail today? ... in Washington, the question of disarmament is deceptively simple. … With enough will, and U.S. training and intelligence, the Lebanese army could move into Hezbollah-controlled areas and take control of the party’s arms depots, enter homes to confiscate weapons, and interdict weapons supplies from Iran. When the army commander, Rudolph Haykal, mentions the risks of a campaign to disarm Hezbollah, realizing that this would place his institution on a collision course with the Shiite community as a whole, desk jockeys in Washington accuse him of going “rogue,” because he believes the military’s priority is “preventing civil war.” The reality is more complicated. Does disarmament mean seizing all the party’s weapons—machine guns, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank missiles, and precision-guided missiles and drones? … No one believes such a scheme is remotely possible.
In a meeting with Ali Larijani in August 2025, [President] Aoun [suggested that] the concern was not with all the party’s weapons, but only those of strategic importance that could be deployed against other countries, primarily Israel … So, if there is a consensus that disarmament is primarily about heavy weapons, this leads to a second question: Given that such weapons were part of an Iranian forward defense strategy aimed at deterring Israel from attacking Iran, and given that this strategy has largely failed, do Hezbollah’s heavy weapons remain as vital in the party’s and Iran’s military thinking? … Hezbollah’s tasks appear to have changed. From being a major component in Iran’s regional defense network, one designed to act autonomously from Tehran and serve as a shock absorber for Israeli attacks, it appears to have been downsized to a support front, the costs of which are increasingly prohibitive for Lebanon’s Shiite community. At the same time, the party appears ready to revive the identity it had during the 1990s, when it was mainly a resistance force seeking to liberate Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory ...
This raises a third question, namely what broader purpose is Hezbollah supposed to serve today for Iran? ... While some believe Hezbollah will benefit from Iranian success in its conflict with the US and Israel, Lebanese realities complicate such an assumption considerably. Hezbollah and its Shiite community are isolated and devastated today, and Lebanon’s political forces will no longer accept the party’s coercion, even if it means resorting to arms … The state must reevaluate Hezbollah’s strengths and weaknesses and devise a plan, involving pressure and dialogue, that avoids a head-on collision with the party, which the state will lose — as it has lost all other armed conflicts with sectarian militias …
President [Aoun] and government must also resist any measures by the US and Israel to railroad the armed forces into a misguided military conflict with Hezbollah and the Shiite community. The purpose of the party’s disarmament, in the end, is to better integrate Shiites into the state, not alienate them by declaring war on their leading communal representative … [What the government] should not do is concede to the US and Israel the latitude to have a final say on matters affecting Lebanon’s stability. The US and Israeli record in recent years has been one of war and destruction, sustained by hubris. Lebanon doesn’t need more of that.
Lebanon FM to the Vatican: ‘We want a “Little Lebanon”; Downplays secession of south Lebanon to Israel’ (Nada Ayoub, Al-Akhbar):
Lebanese FM Youssef Raji does not act so much as Lebanon’s foreign minister as he appears to be a political envoy on behalf of [the Lebanese Forces], conveying to the outside world the concerns of the ‘Lebanese Forces’ and their ideological choices, rather than what is supposed to be the official position of a state representing all Lebanese. He does not speak the language of a state trying to protect its unity in the face of the gravest existential threat it faces, but rather the language of a political faction still captive to old isolationist tendencies, to which it returns in every crisis as if they were a salvation project. What is most dangerous is that this rhetoric is … is being promoted in international and ecclesiastical forums as an approach to the very future of Lebanon itself.
During his visit to Italy [in early May], the FM of the ‘Lebanese Forces’ promoted extremely dangerous ideas, in which he appeared to be the voice of the ‘Forces’ seeking to revive the partitionist project in Lebanon. According to sources familiar with the visit, during his meeting with the Vatican’s Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro Parolin ... Raggi was quoted as saying that “there is no objection to returning to the idea of a ‘small Lebanon’ if this formula ensures stability, economic prosperity and protection for Christians” … Sources emphasise that “the atmosphere Raggi sought to create in the Vatican strikes at the very heart of the current Lebanese model, namely Greater Lebanon as the definitive homeland for all its citizens. More dangerously, the [Lebanese] Forces’ rhetoric conveyed by Raji seeks to suggest within the Vatican that Christians in Lebanon are not concerned with the 10,452 square kilometres, and that Israel’s annexation of parts of the south is not a priority for them, as long as ‘Little Lebanon’ is the project for the salvation of Lebanon’s Christians” …
The danger of this argument is that it comes at the height of Israel’s open threats to annex parts of southern Lebanon, sometimes under the guise of ‘buffer zones’, and at other times through calls for settlement issued by extremist ministers in the occupation government … It also comes in the midst of a war that Israel is waging not only with fire, but also through systematic investment in sectarian incitement, particularly between Christians and Shias … However, according to those in the know, the Vatican has no intention of encouraging any divisive projects in Lebanon, and has not altered its historic stance in support of coexistence … Pope Leo XIV had previously sent clear messages in the interests of the unity of Lebanon and its people ... He also repeatedly called for a ceasefire, emphasising that the protection of civilians is a “moral duty” …
The deeper problem lies in the “Lebanese Forces”’ inability to abandon their right-wing isolationist legacy. Its rhetoric is not limited to attempting to influence the Vatican, but extends to the Christian community itself, through the reproduction and glorification of the idea of ‘Little Lebanon’ or ‘Original Lebanon’ – that is, a Lebanon with a Christian majority prior to the establishment of Greater Lebanon. This narrative is being promoted within universities and certain religious and student circles as a model of a ‘civilised, flourishing Lebanon’ that was corrupted by the inclusion of Muslims …
Beyond the ceasefire, US working to reorder Lebanon from within (Tamjid Kobaissy, The Cradle):
What began as talk of containment, diplomacy, and buying time has hardened into a political and security course shaped in Washington to reorder Lebanon from within, tighten the siege around Hezbollah, and push toward the end of the resistance’s military role … In recent months, Lebanese state institutions have appeared to move beneath the ceiling of direct American decision-making ... in security [and] politics … Discussion has moved beyond field arrangements linked to the ceasefire. What is now being prepared is a security track under American sponsorship between Lebanon and the Israeli enemy … Informed Lebanese political and security sources tell The Cradle that ... Washington is examining mechanisms through which the Lebanese army would announce control over Hezbollah-linked facilities as part of the broader disarmament file – a formula that would move the confrontation with the resistance from Israeli firepower to Lebanese state institutions ...
Sources familiar with Hezbollah’s position say the party views the authority’s move toward a security track with Israel as a step far beyond ceasefire arrangements or traditional understandings … A security agreement with the enemy would be treated as a declaration of internal confrontation, and Hezbollah would act on that basis. According to these sources, Hezbollah sees any such agreement as an attempt to insert Lebanon into a security architecture that directly serves Israeli interests under US command. In practical terms, this would mark a transition from pressuring the resistance to encircling it from within … Any effort to impose such a pact could open the door to a wide internal escalation ...
Alongside talk of a “buffer zone” in the south, political and security circles increasingly believe that Israel wants far more than a traditional security belt or the removal of resistance fighters from the border. The Israeli project is effectively to turn the first line of southern villages into an advanced settlement–security belt. Its purpose would be to protect the northern settlements, secure the depth of the Galilee, and impose new demographic and military facts on the border. Under this reading, Israel treats Lebanon’s border villages as part of the security equation of its own north. This echoes an older Zionist practice in the Galilee of using settlement outposts to impose new demographic facts, secure territorial continuity, and turn Palestinian geography into the outer layer of Israel’s security architecture. The Israeli insistence on emptying certain villages ... suggests that the objective is a gradual transformation of the area itself – its population, its function, and its strategic meaning.
Minor edits have been made for clarity during translation.
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