Israel's ‘Algorithmic War' & 'Algorithmic Assassinations' in Lebanon continue unabated

A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations in West Asia (Lebanon & Syria) -- Analysis & reports from the Arabic/ regional press & other sources (16 Dec 2025)

US-Israeli Coercion of Normalisation on Lebanon — The US-Israeli-Saudi-UAE nexus and the Lebanese Right /

‘Hezbollah will not accept “any framework that leads to surrender to the Israeli entity and the American tyrant”’ /

US Ambassador to Lebanon: ‘Contain Hizbullah’s weapons if disarmament proves impossible’ /

Hezbollah & Saudi Arabia’s uneasy détente — Strategic Divergence, Tactical Convergence /

Securing Joulani’s Rule: US support for ““enlightened authoritarianism” in Syria /

South Syria is boiling: Has a resistance movement formed to confront Israel? /

“Events cast their own shadows”: The Unfinished Question of 8 December in Syria. What Exactly Collapsed?

STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVES & CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS —

US-Israeli Coercion of Normalisation on Lebanon — The US-Israeli-Saudi-UAE nexus and the Lebanese Right (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar):

A year into the open US–Saudi tutelage, Lebanon remains politically adrift: no governing consensus, no alternative to the pre-war order, and no clear sense of direction. Washington’s position, voiced bluntly by envoy Tom Barrack, is that Lebanon is a failed state incapable of managing its own affairs. Mohammed bin Salman has repeated the same assessment. Both capitals want to steer Lebanon’s course without assuming responsibility for its collapse … [UN Envoy Barrak’s] vision is to “outsource” the country to whichever actor can impose stability.

In this framework, the “New Syria” under Ahmad al-Sharaa is expected to emerge as a central player. Washington’s concerns revolve around who holds political authority in Beirut and how Lebanon’s economy can be absorbed into Syria’s economic and financial networks. Barrack’s immediate priority, however, is more direct: securing al-Sharaa’s rule. In that equation, democracy becomes irrelevant. The region, he argues, needs “enlightened authoritarianism,” not liberal systems.

Inside Lebanon, this approach has translated into a search for a coercive governing force. [President Aoun has] warned that any attempt to disarm Hezbollah by force would trigger a large-scale civil war, “something neither desired nor manageable.” Senior political and military figures quietly concurred: there is no desire for a new internal conflict. [However] Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea ... the last major figure of the Lebanese right ... rejects the argument that disarmament risks civil war, reframing such a scenario as a “security operation by the state against a minority holding the country hostage”. The narrative reveals how little the underlying mindset has changed: the same militia logic that made the Lebanese Forces one of the most violent actors of the civil war endures. Over the past two years, Israel has waged its confrontation with the resistance without relying on Lebanese partners. Now, as Israeli officials revisit a military option, they expect someone inside Lebanon to meet them halfway, preferably under US-Saudi cover. Behind the scenes, Israeli intelligence, working with the UAE, has been cultivating networks among Lebanese figures and groups to push them toward direct confrontation with Hezbollah, while promising support and protection in return. One dimension of this … [is] to normalize discussions of peace. A political, media, and financial nexus now stretches from the Lebanese Forces’ headquarters to Abu Dhabi and Washington. The Lebanese Forces, unwilling to let others take the lead, have positioned themselves at the forefront. Their rhetoric escalated ahead of parliamentary elections … [Geagea] believes that US- and Israel-aligned forces should take control of the state, capitalize on the regional environment, and move toward banning Hezbollah altogether. The current focus on its “military wing” is merely a doorway; the real objective is to dissolve the party entirely, much as Syria once dismantled the Lebanese Forces during its dominance over Lebanon. [Geagea aims to reclaim] the position of primary Christian leader and reviving the old project of a Christian-led entity across most of Mount Lebanon, even if it means another Israeli invasion or a push by al-Sharaa’s forces into the Bekaa and the North. This is the landscape of Lebanon’s internal divide. Anyone serious about confronting the US-Israeli-Saudi project and its Lebanese allies must be prepared to confront Israel directly while also engaging the domestic arena. The only viable alternative remains the construction of a civil state that treats sectarianism as a disease to be contained, not a system to be managed.

Israel’s ‘algorithmic warfare’ Lebanon: Automated Intelligence & Algorithmic Assassination (Mohamad Shams Eddine, The Cradle):

In a battlefield shaped by data, cables, and algorithms, Tel Aviv has rendered even the most disciplined resistance movements vulnerable to a new kind of warfare. Within Hezbollah, operational security is almost sacrosanct. Senior figures adhere to rigid, high-level protocols designed to evade digital detection. But in this age of relentless surveillance, even airtight discipline is no longer enough. The threat now … affects the entire support environment, which, often unknowingly, becomes the weakest link through which targets can be traced. In one of the most shocking intelligence breaches in recent memory, Israel in September 2024 detonated thousands of booby-trapped pagers and walkie-talkies that had been covertly distributed among Hezbollah’s ranks. The devices … exploded simultaneously across Lebanon, killing dozens and maiming thousands. It was a devastating act of remote sabotage, designed not only to eliminate personnel, but to sow mistrust in the very tools of communication. The latest breach of Hezbollah’s operational environment marks a technological leap that fundamentally alters the rules of engagement. The confrontation between Israel and the Lebanese resistance has now entered the era of automated intelligence, where algorithms become soldiers, phones transform into battlegrounds, and undersea cables serve as launchpads for digital warfare.

Resistance under siege by its own digital shadow: To grasp how commanders are now being reached inside Hezbollah’s fortified operational circles, one must first understand the layered technological arsenal deployed against them. The breach emerges from the fusion of dozens of surveillance systems into a unified, real-time data engine. In the past, hacking meant breaching a phone or computer. Today, the paradigm has shifted. The new target is not the device itself, but the digital ecosystem surrounding it. Israeli intelligence no longer needs to penetrate Hezbollah devices directly. They monitor the people around the target, the signals emitted by their environment, and the data shared unwittingly by family, friends, or even neighbours. A commander might carry a phone with no internet access, avoid public networks, and live free of digital identifiers. It doesn’t matter. Surveillance focuses on his driver, whose smartphone logs every route. The building Wi-Fi silently confirms presence. Smart cars track speed, location, and habits. Street cameras catch his face; apps map who else is nearby. As a result, the target’s own environment becomes compromised. This model of infiltration is called Environmental Fingerprint Profiling (EFP). And it is the most lethal vulnerability facing any resistance movement embedded in a civilian society.

Western media often marvels at Hezbollah’s use of encrypted communications – and rightly so. Its internal devices are virtually impenetrable. But what is often overlooked is that encryption does not block metadata. Metadata is not about content but context – for example, who connected, when, where, for how long, and to whom. It is the overlooked shadow of every secure communication. And when metadata is cross-referenced with artificial intelligence (AI), the result is devastating. Patterns alone – time, location, movement – can unmask an identity. A person need not speak a word. Their silence still leaves traces. And those traces are enough to kill … The kill chain begins not with live feeds, but with buried signals recovered from memory banks. Yesterday’s data is today’s weapon …

One of the most alarming shifts in Lebanon’s surveillance theater is the proliferation of biometric targeting – facial and voice recognition drawn not from state systems, but from ordinary urban life. Commercial CCTV in storefronts. Building security footage. Traffic cameras. Smartphones in people’s pockets … Israeli drones are no longer just eyes in the sky. At high altitudes, their sensors scoop up invisible emissions: signals from idle phones, Wi-Fi networks, Bluetooth from passing cars. Frequency spectra are analysed to detect if encrypted devices are active inside buildings … Signals collected by drones are combined with metadata, AI analysis, ground informants, and environmental profiling. From this mesh, a detailed map of the target’s presence emerges. And then comes the kill map. Once the data network completes its modelling, the system generates a Target Confidence Heatmap. It identifies when the target is most likely to be present, estimates how many people are nearby, selects the ideal strike point, and even calculates how to minimize collateral damage. Only then does artificial intelligence transition into an active combat decision.

Machines decide who dies: The shift toward algorithmic assassination is not without alarm from military insiders. Around the world, senior analysts and officers are voicing concerns about the speed and autonomy of machine-led warfare … As reliance on AI expands in modern warfare, debates grow louder over the line between military precision and algorithmic murder – when machines, not humans, decide who deserves to die …

Israel’s war on Hezbollah has moved beyond traditional battlefields. It now targets the digital shadows around resistance fighters, stripping away the invisibility that once served as their first line of defense … The next war won’t be waged solely in the hills of south Lebanon or on the borders of occupied Palestine. It will unfold beneath the sea, in orbital satellites, across server farms and frequency bands, inside the machines we carry in our pockets. This is the age of algorithmic warfare. And no resistance can afford to ignore it.

Why the US pressing Lebanon on normalisation with Israel is a terrible idea (Michael Young, The National/Carnegie):

It is clear that the US objective is to lock Lebanon into negotiations with Israel that lead to a normalisation of their relations. The Lebanese, in turn, reject this, and still adhere to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which offers Israel peace in return for a withdrawal from all Arab occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The [Trump] administration is supportive of Israel, and not particularly sympathetic to the Lebanese position … the Americans are especially keen to pursue the Abraham Accords trajectory, which Israel also wants … At the same time, Mr Trump and those around him may be influenced by an emerging nexus in Washington that includes institutions close to Israel and Lebanese individuals who believe Lebanese-Israeli peace would marginalise Hezbollah and help Lebanon to prosper … The problem, however, is that shoehorning Lebanon into policy with little purchase in Lebanese society could lead to a major rift in the country, and even provoke foreign efforts to undermine any prospect of a Lebanese-Israeli settlement. To presume that Hezbollah is the sole obstacle to Lebanon-Israel peace is a mistake. Lebanese-Israeli normalisation has many critics in the region, not to say quite a few Lebanese who see no good reason at present to go beyond agreeing security measures with Israel in the south … Forcing the issue could very well lead to Iranian and Turkish efforts to undermine what is achieved. The reason for this is that the broader dynamics today in the Levant are being defined by an Israeli, Turkish and Iranian contest to expand each country’s respective sphere of interest – or in Iran’s case, mainly to preserve what still remains.

Lebanon and Syria find themselves at the heart of this regional tug of war. Turkey and Israel have clashing interests in Syria, and the Turks and Iranians have moved closer because of a common desire to contain Israeli power, even if Turkey wants to prevent Iran from destabilising Syria. Notably, Hezbollah recently sent a delegation to Istanbul [which] allegedly followed other meetings between the group’s members and Turkish officials.

Turkish interest in Lebanon may not have been strong previously, but it has increased in light of Turkey’s growing tensions with Israel ... The Turks were particularly incensed by a recent deal between Lebanon and Cyprus to delineate their maritime border, which they believe encroaches on their own preferences for the maritime border with the Turkish portion of Cyprus, as well as with Syria. Moreover, defining the maritime border between Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus in theory facilitates any potential deal to export Lebanon’s offshore hydrocarbons, if they exist, in co-operation with Israel and Cyprus. The Turks, in turn, would like the main transfer route of oil and gas from the Levant to Europe to pass through Turkey, a transit point for numerous pipelines from Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East towards Europe. Therefore, the Lebanese cannot afford to place themselves outside an Arab consensus on Israel, and will certainly not seek a rapprochement that might exacerbate their own ties with Turkey and Syria. Knowing that Iran and Turkey have a shared interest in ensuring Lebanon isn’t absorbed into an Israeli-aligned sphere, the Lebanese cannot allow schisms in their society that could be exploited, and widened, by outside powers. That is why the US pressing on normalisation with Israel is a terrible idea. When divided states are forced to take sides among contending regional powers, the results can be disastrous as this only aggravates domestic conflict … Lebanon and Israel must ensure that cross-border attacks against each other end, but beyond that, normalisation is a step too far today.

US Ambassador to Lebanon: “Containing weapons if disarmament proves impossible” (Al-Modon daily):

A new, unambiguous American position was expressed by the US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, during a dinner hosted by MP Fouad Makhzoumi … along with the ATFL delegation headed by Edward Gabriel, and in the presence of several Lebanese MPs. In response to a question from MP Michel Mouawad regarding the necessity of continuing to pressure Hezbollah to surrender its weapons, [US Ambassador] Issa stated: “What we have achieved in terms of the monopoly of arms is good. Beyond that, the weapons must be contained if disarmament proves impossible, and the United States is committed to assisting the army” … [Recent] statements of Ambassador Michel Issa and Edward Gabriel [are more conciliatory]. Their approach is akin to the saying, “If you can’t achieve everything, don’t abandon everything.” If the goal cannot be fully realized, one can be satisfied with what has been accomplished … Gabriel responded to a question by saying, “What we have achieved regarding weapons is good, and we must work to complete their monopoly by the state, but calmly and without causing the country’s situation to deteriorate. The army is carrying out its duties and has taken important steps, and the roadmap is clear” …

There does not appear to be a decisive and unified American position regarding the situation in Lebanon … At times, [we] sense that the chances of a settlement are slim, and that Israel has received a green light from the US to do as it pleases. At other times, [we] hear talk of the need to de-escalate the situation … Ambassador Issa [said] … he is trying to unify the American vision regarding the situation in Lebanon … The key lies in what will result from Trump’s meeting with Netanyahu, and in the US political direction for the period following the Army’s completion of its mission to withdraw weapons south of the Litani River and its subsequent move to the north of the Litani.

Hizbullah’s strategic ambiguity has hardened into near-total opacity (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar):

Hezbollah has absorbed losses that reach deep into its senior ranks. Militarily, the party adapted. Politically, however, a new front has opened inside Lebanon … Hezbollah is still avoiding any internal confrontation, knowing that many Lebanese political forces are eager to redirect attention away from the Occupation, towards a domestic clash. But this restraint has limits. Pressure is growing as influential forces within the state move openly to satisfy US and Saudi demands, while Israel’s allies let go of any remaining hesitation about declaring or acting on their relationship with Tel Aviv. What appears to be individual or reckless gestures toward normalisation has become a coordinated political direction. With US backing, efforts are underway to entrench normalisation … Those advancing this path fall into two groups: one ideologically committed to normalisation, and another seeking to convince Washington of its readiness to confront Hezbollah if granted full control of the state. What unites them is a shared assumption: that no serious popular or political resistance remains to block this trajectory … This challenge does not concern Hezbollah alone. It confronts everyone who still believes in resisting occupation and rejecting normalisation. Yet there is little sign of an organised political response. The judiciary remains paralysed, subordinate to a political authority that either underestimates or ignores the consequences of this shift.

Meanwhile, Israel’s primary focus remains Hezbollah. Israeli intelligence is not only tracking the party’s post-war activity but also attempting to anticipate its next phase. Here, uncertainty dominates. For months, even those with close ties to Hezbollah’s leadership have been unable to extract clear answers about the party’s activity. Confident media claims about its direction are therefore unreliable … Yet it is widely understood that equations change only through action that forces Israel to reconsider its aggression … Inside Hezbollah, silence is expanding. What was once strategic ambiguity has hardened into near-total opacity. This complicates Israeli planning—but it also weighs on the party’s base. Supporters understand that deterrence cannot be restored without confronting Israel, even as internal pressure continues to rise. What should not be expected is a dramatic pivot in domestic files. Hezbollah does not see the current government as an ally, yet it has no intention of abandoning it now. The reasons are strategic—chief among them the approaching decision on whether parliamentary elections will be held in May. Those elections will be a key test. US-Saudi pressure is intensifying to block any figure willing to cooperate electorally with Hezbollah, particularly among Shiite figures aligned with Speaker Nabih Berri. Hezbollah remains confident in the solidity of its core support. The uncertainty lies elsewhere: in the absence, so far, of a clear political framework outlining how the party intends to engage the next phase—inside the state, in parliament, and under sustained external pressure.

Hezbollah defiant: ‘We will not accept “any framework that leads to surrender to the Israeli entity and the American tyrant”’:

Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem confirmed on 13 December that the Resistance is willing to cooperate fully with the Lebanese Army, but emphasized that it is not ready “for any framework that leads to surrender to the Israeli entity and the American tyrant”. “Since the ceasefire agreement was reached, we have entered a new phase … Once the agreement was concluded, the state became responsible for ending the occupation and consolidating the army’s presence, and the resistance has done everything required of it”, Qassem said. He continued:
“What is being discussed is an Israeli-American demand … With surrender, Lebanon will not survive, and Syria is a model before us”. “We will defend ourselves even if the sky were to close in on the earth. The weapons will not be taken away in implementation of Israel’s demands, even if the whole world unites against Lebanon”, Qassem stated.

Qassem highlighted recent remarks by Diotto Abagnara, Commander of UNIFIL who told Israeli media that Hezbollah is not rearming, contradicting Tel Aviv’s assertions to justify nonstop ceasefire violations in Lebanon. He also urged Lebanese authorities to “stop making concessions … Implement the agreement … Do not ask us not to defend ourselves, while the state is unable to protect its citizens. Let the state provide protection and sovereignty, and then we will put everything on the table for dialogue on the defense strategy, and reach a conclusion.”

From Resistance to ‘Negotiations’ & ‘Economic Peace with Israel’ (Mohamad Hasan Sweidan, The Cradle):

What began as a US-sponsored technical committee to manage ceasefires is quietly transforming southern Lebanon into a testing ground for economic and security control. Under the guise of civilian participation and ‘technical talks,’ the committee is experimenting with tools that could reshape the region’s political and economic landscape, blurring the line between diplomacy and strategic influence. A committee that once brought together fatigued military officers and outdated maps now includes civilians with political mandates … [including] Simon Karam, a former ambassador and outspoken critic of Hezbollah. But behind this procedural change lies a strategic recalibration with far-reaching consequences … The quiet inclusion of a civilian with explicit anti-resistance credentials signals a broader political shift, not necessarily an overt act of normalization, but a calculated rehearsal for it … What began as a purely military channel is now being recast as a civil-military dialogue … The committee is already discussing high-stakes political issues — Security arrangements south of the Litani, timetables for Hezbollah’s disarmament, and plans for the contested border enclaves, all of which are about reshaping Lebanon’s southern frontier … Washington’s goal is simple: recast the Lebanese state as the sole security actor, gradually strip Hezbollah of its legitimacy, and replace military deterrence with donor-funded incentives. This mirrors Israel’s post-Oslo approach to the occupied West Bank in pacifying the population through economic incentives, avoiding political concessions, and entrenching structural dependence. This model, often dubbed “economic peace,” has transformed the Palestinian Authority (PA) into a subcontractor of occupation … Now, that same model is being exported to Lebanon … In this framework, Lebanon’s south becomes both a buffer zone and a test case. A place to apply economic tools as substitutes for sovereignty. Yet this is another example of creeping annexation. President Aoun’s recent remarks to visiting representatives of the UN Security Council that Beirut “has adopted the option of negotiations with Israel” and that “there is no going back” signal a deeper shift in the state’s posture. The taboo against direct dealings with Tel Aviv is gradually eroding through bureaucratic habit. What is unfolding is a slow, procedural absorption into a new status quo, where diplomatic euphemisms replace red lines and the mechanics of ‘technical dialogue’ wear down the politics of resistance. Lebanon is being maneuvered into a framework of economic and security dependency. The language may be cautious, but the architecture being laid is one in which sovereignty is progressively outsourced – often without any public reckoning.

Lebanon Faces a Quiet Bid to Rewrite Its Borders (Al-Akhbar):

[US Envoy] Barrack’s repeated references to placing Lebanon under what he calls the “al-Joulani Emirate” in Syria are not casual remarks, but the latest indication of a political and strategic project that directly targets Lebanon’s borders and sovereignty. Such language, coming from a representative of a president who has already redrawn regional maps with the stroke of a pen, cannot be dismissed as rhetorical excess. In this case, it signals an agenda that appears to be moving from the realm of talk to the realm of preparation … Calling the proposal an “economic project” is meant to strip it of its political meaning, but the idea of handing land in south Lebanon to a US company echoes well-known settlement practices in colonized or occupied areas. Land is never neutral. When it changes hands, the power that governs it changes too along with the security over it, the resources beneath it, and the people who live on it. Ownership becomes a way to shift borders, weaken sovereignty, and quietly reshape the map. Dressing such a plan up as development only hides its real goal: slowly redrawing Lebanon under the cover of investment. The Lebanese authorities’ silence in the face of such a threat deepens rather than mitigates the danger. Silence, in such contexts, does not amount to strategic caution; it only shows neglect … The emerging plan fits neatly into a broader regional reconfiguration project designed to secure the interests of major powers and their allies. It is a process that often begins with an unusual statement, followed by a policy paper, a media narrative, economic leverage, and finally a negotiating table where such projects are presented as solutions. Lebanon, facing this convergence of pressure and vulnerability, requires a sharp and unambiguous stance: the country is not up for acquisition, the South is not a real estate parcel, and land cannot be detached from identity.

‘Obey to Survive’ — The US’s new Syria geo-strategic model (Al-Akhbar):

Despite the [removal by the US of the Caesar Sanctions] several hurdles remain. Syria lacks a reliable legislative framework to protect investors, while the security situation remains deeply unstable. In the south, Israel continues to pursue new control arrangements, supporting an emerging Druze “self-administration” in Suwayda following massacres carried out by factions linked to or affiliated with the Damascus authorities. In the northeast, the integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) into state structures, agreed on March 10 by al-Sharaa and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi, remains stalled due to disputes over Syria’s future governance model … Having effectively become the dominant external actor shaping the Syrian file, through its special envoy, Barrack, the US is now seeking to present Syria as a model of the kind of “support” it offers to states or forces that submit to its framework. This helps explain Washington’s determination to promote Syria as a political success story in a country that was once a close ally of Iran and a key corridor for weapons transfers to regional resistance movements. Unlike US projects in Afghanistan or Iraq, the former Syrian government did not collapse as a result of direct US military intervention. This has allowed Washington greater room to operate politically as a “supporting power,” nurturing the hope that the “Syrian model” will encourage other actors in the region to follow the same path taken by al-Sharaa, without any guarantee of the model’s durability or success.

“Events cast their own shadows”: The Unfinished Question of December 8 in Syria: What Exactly Collapsed? (Al-Akhbar):

Was December 8, 2024, the fall of the Syrian regime? Or was it the collapse of the Syrian state itself, planned with meticulous care over many years? To approach this question, one may look beyond these statements and “exposés” … [and] examine the emerging features of the “new Syria” as they appear on the threshold of the first year after the fall. Outcomes speak for themselves; events, as the saying goes, cast their own shadows. Over the past eleven months, Syria has witnessed shifting alignments, crises, violations, and chaos. The cumulative result has been deep social fractures—sectarian, religious, and ethnic. Some communities have even gone so far as to call for division or secession. The state has been reduced to something resembling a “phantom entity,” its connective structures torn apart, whatever remains of them unable to perform their function.

With this new reality, Syrians have split into two broad camps. The first believes that the mere fall of the regime—which had ruled for around 54 years and imposed heavy burdens on society and its active forces—represents, in itself, a gateway to a new future for the country. For them, concerns about security, violations, or displacement can be addressed in due time, depending on a range of factors … They maintain that the long decades of Baath rule destroyed every nucleus of renewal: from crushing freedoms and eliminating political participation to moulding society in rigid directions ... The second camp argues that what happened on December 8 bears no relation to the events of March 18, 2011—a date most Syrians mark as the beginning of rebellion against tyranny and repression. What happened in the first moment, they say, was a scenario drafted in regional and international intelligence rooms, relying on local actors who had no connection to the “revolutionary” movement represented by the second moment. According to this view, the goal of those external actors was, first and foremost, to dismantle the old geopolitical order and construct a new one upon its ruins—ushering in major changes not only in Syria, but across the entire region. Crucially, they argue, the consequences of this project will inevitably reproduce a new authoritarian regime—one even more expansive than its predecessor.

This polarization remains in its formative stage … [with] distinct social bases for each camp. The first draws its strength from Sunni opponents of the former regime, along with traditional, religious, and tribal groups. The second is rooted largely in youth and students, in addition to minority communities seeking to build a state that transcends sectarian, religious, and ethnic boundaries. The divide between them is no longer a simple difference in “vision,” but a clash approaching the existential: a socio-cultural confrontation in which the victory of the opposing project would threaten each side’s way of life, beliefs, traditions, and even their imagined “Syria.” These potential outcomes have not escaped the calculations of foreign powers … — this was the lesson of Iraq, when US civil administrator Paul Bremer, after Baghdad’s fall in May 2003, dissolved the army and security institutions, hastening the disintegration of the Iraqi state … Today Syria once again stands on the brink of collapse, both historically and geographically. Its current trajectory suggests that external actors have successfully placed the dynamics of fragmentation firmly on track, setting them in motion toward their envisaged outcome.

South Syria is boiling: Has a resistance movement formed to confront Israel? (Munir al-Rabih, Al-Modon):

The situation in southern Syria does not suggest that stability will remain. Numerous indicators point to the possibility of a confrontation erupting at any moment. Israeli activity has recently increased, with daily violations being recorded, amid fears that the Israelis will expand their military operations ... The fundamental question, however, is whether the Syrians will allow this, or whether the seeds of popular resistance are beginning to sprout ... Israeli incursions are now being met with counter-movements, unlike the situation previously. Since the Israelis could no longer enter populated areas without encountering resistance, the events in Khan Arnabeh, which prompted them to fire directly at the residents to secure their withdrawal, were preceded by a confrontation in the town of Beit Jann [where] the entire population resisted the Israeli incursion …

The Dollarization of the Syrian Economy (Al-Ittihad, UAE daily):

Dollarization [has] quickly spread across [Syria], no longer confined to the private sector but extending to public institutions as well. Without question, the dollarization of the Syrian economy carries important benefits, including shielding individuals and institutions from the risks of currency depreciation and volatility, protecting against inflation, and encouraging investment. Dollarisation helps integrate the local economy into global financial systems. Yet it comes with substantial risks, especially because full dollarization undermines monetary independence and erodes confidence in the national currency, which remains a core symbol of sovereignty. Recognizing that limited activity by existing banks is insufficient to counter dollarization and protect the lira, Central Bank Governor Abdulkader Husrieh announced a long-term strategic plan to double the number of banks operating in Syria—from 16 today to 30 by 2030.

Poll: Only 14 percent of Syrians support normalization with Israel

Foreign Affairs published an in-depth survey of Syrians’ opinions on 6 December. Arab Barometer and RMTeam International had been commissioned to conduct in-person interviews. Just 4% have a favorable opinion of Israel, and only 14% support normalizing relations with Israel. A similarly small number said they support Iran (5%), while slightly more expressed support for Russia (16%). Nearly all Syrians (92%) said they view Israel’s occupation of the Palestinian territories and strikes on Iran, Lebanon, and Syria as critical threats to their security. At the same time, 66% have a favorable view of the US, including 60% of minorities. Many view Trump positively (61%). The survey showed that Syrians remained divided politically on sectarian lines. The majority Sunni population expressed confidence in Sharaa and his government overall, while Alawite, Druze, and Christian religious minorities said they live in fear of the new government … A majority of Syrians cited the economy as a major concern, including inflation, a lack of jobs, and poverty. A large number of Syrians reported that securing their basic needs is difficult (56%), while a shocking 86% said their household income does not cover their expenses. Nearly two-thirds of Syrians said they suffer from food insecurity.