Netanyahu Concedes on “Total Victory" -- Redefines 'Victory', Changes Goals of the War

Conflicts Forum’s compilation of consequential observations & strategic perspectives from leading Israeli commentators, 18 March 2026

Ronen Bergman: ‘NO LONGER TOTAL VICTORY’ —

‘For a week, Netanyahu realized that the chances of achieving the war goals were very low, so he simply changed the goals and the definition of success’

“[With] no end in sight on any of the fronts [Gaza, Lebanon and Iran], Netanyahu is effectively burying the idea of ​​”total victory” and making it clear that there is no such thing”

“It suddenly became clear that the ... existential threat that threatens to destroy the State of Israel, is suddenly not so important, because “threats rise and threats fall” -- a natural process that happens everywhere …”.

Anna Barsky: THE BATTLE OVER CONSCIOUSNESS & NARRATIVE IN ISRAEL —

‘The Israeli public is almost never exposed to the facts of the war as they are’

‘Senior Israeli political figure claims Iran is weakening; “Overthrow of the regime possible if fighting continues”’

Senior Israeli political official: ‘The concept is to assassinate “the heads of the regime one by one”’ .

[These compilations are drawn from analysis & commentary predominantly by leading Israeli political, security and intelligence commentators, mainly from the Hebrew press — as reports published in Hebrew often provide a different window on Israeli internal discourse].

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS; CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS —

‘NO LONGER TOTAL VICTORY’

‘For a week, Netanyahu realized that the chances of achieving the war goals were very low, so he simply changed the goals and the definition of success’ (Ronen Bergman, leading Israeli & NY Times security & intelligence commentator, writing in Yedioth Ahoronot):

Once again, Netanyahu is reading the map faster than anyone. For about a week now, he has understood that the attack on Iran is not achieving the goals that were defined for it ... And if the attack is not going as planned, it is also not ... ripening the juicy political fruit of voter migration on the [political] map, [nor] strengthening Likud, [nor] increasing the percentage of support for Netanyahu as the next PM … The success in the campaign against Hezbollah in September 2024, the attack on Iran in October [2024], and what was marketed very successfully as a tremendous success in [the June 2025 attack], gave rise to quite a bit of smugness ... In this atmosphere of euphoria, several sources close to Netanyahu had already begun to ponder out loud the date. Not the date of the attack, but the date of the elections, which they thought would be set for the end of June 2026, or July 7 …

[But] when things started to get complicated -- the regime in Iran did not suddenly shake when they beheaded the leader; instead of embarrassment and defeat, the Revolutionary Guards attacked back with all their might; the protesters did not take to the streets again; Hezbollah joined in fully ...; in the US, unprecedented public criticism arose over what many saw as unnecessary involvement in the campaign when there was no clear danger to its interests; a global energy crisis could erupt due to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz; and the enriched uranium, for the time being at least, remained with the Iranians -- Netanyahu was the first to recognize it …

When he realized that the chances of achieving the war’s goals – a success that could have brought him an election victory – were very low, he was quick to react and simply changed the goals, the strategy, and the definition of success. In a series of briefings, messages and tweets, summar[ized] in the press conference he held last Thursday [12 March] Netanyahu changed Israel’s security-strategic concept from end to end, and formulated a new definition of victory ...

‘Eight months later and a magic trick’: While the entire country was preoccupied with his demand to drop the legal proceedings ... against [him] … Netanyahu rewrote the instruction book … [The] things Netanyahu said ... in the past week, [indicate] that [he] has decided to leave behind everything he dreamed and preached [about] … In his speech this week ... these two words [‘existential threat’] did not appear at all … And that’s it.

Netanyahu explained why he no longer talks about an existential threat -- simply because it suddenly became clear that this, that is, the existential threat that threatens to destroy the State of Israel, is suddenly not so important, because “threats rise and threats fall” -- a natural process that happens everywhere …

And if in June [2025] the removal of the threat ... was the goal of the entire event ... it turns out that in March 2026 something completely different will ensure the eternity of Israel. What Netanyahu say [last week]? “The only way to ensure your existence, your future, your prosperity and the alliances that are made with you is to be very strong and there is no doubt that from campaign to campaign ... Israel is emerging stronger than ever before …. Today we are at least a regional power and the whole world is amazed ... This combination guarantees our future”.

Wait, what did he say there? After all, if Iran poses an existential threat to the State of Israel, as Netanyahu has been teaching us all these years, then that should be the center of attention … In June [2025], “removing the existential threat” is what guaranteed our existence for generations. But for the new Netanyahu, “threats are rising and threats are falling” and there is no need to get excited. The new Netanyahu believes that words, alliances and nations that bewitch Israeli power, are the secret weapon that will allow us to survive for generations. Netanyahu’s new security concept, which he made sure to repeat four times in 37 minutes, [now] fills the empty spaces …

At this pace of events, Netanyahu [will get] to the elections with three combat fronts on which nothing is decided: not in Gaza, where Hamas rules with a strong hand; not in Lebanon, where Hezbollah remains the strongest military and political force in the country; and not in Iran … Netanyahu apparently thought that things would go differently … With Hezbollah, [he hoped] that the massive war in the Gulf would allow Israel to close the deal with the Shiite terrorist organization and resolve at least this front. On the Iranian front, Netanyahu joined the optimistic predictions of security sources … who believed that the conditions for regime change could be created not just somewhere in the future, but in the very short term … The [result] was less than heartwarming: the masses did not come out; … Trump is furious that his Central Command did not consider the possibility that Iran would block the Straits, even though it has been threatening to do so for three decades during its war of survival.

And so, in a situation where there is no end in sight to any of the fronts, Netanyahu is effectively burying the idea of ​​”total victory” and making it clear that there is no such thing, and that there is definitely a possibility of additional rounds. And [that] this is the right moment for him to draw up new goals for the war and to hell with the nuclear or missile threat ... the main thing is that it will be possible to declare victory. No longer total [victory], of course.

THE BATTLE OVER CONSCIOUSNESS & THE NARRATIVE OF WAR IN ISRAEL

‘The Truth is Drowning in Hormuz — Truths & drama that Netanyahu’s entourage is trying to hide from the public’ (Anna Barsky, leading Israeli political commentator, Ma’ariv, 17 March):

Alongside the battles in the skies over Tehran, Beirut and the Strait of Hormuz, another campaign is now underway [in Israel], quieter but almost equally important: the campaign for consciousness, for the explanation, for the story that will remain in the public consciousness while the dust of the battles is still in the air. This is a well-known political pattern … As soon as a war gets complicated, prolonged or simply it becomes clear that it is more complex than the promises that preceded it, a battle immediately opens over the narrative. Not over the facts alone, but above all over their meaning, over the framing, over the way in which the public will be asked to understand what is happening before their eyes. This is exactly what is happening now around the campaign in Iran.

Faced [with] ... the cumulative costs of the campaign, according to which there are major achievements, but also real difficulties and open question marks, those around Netanyahu seek to establish a different story. There they talk about controlling the situation, emphasize full coordination with the White House, and present the course of the war as a plan that is progressing more or less as it was intended to progress. This is not a normal debate between two legitimate interpretations. This is a struggle over the framing of the war itself, and therefore also over its political significance. If we accept the picture drawn by those involved in the details, including sources in the US, the conclusion is that the campaign has created much deeper dilemmas than were initially presented. The Hormuz question is far from resolved, the military strike on Iran has not yet translated into a strategic [outcome], the Lebanese arena adds another layer of instability, and the next steps could be more dangerous, expensive, and complex than their predecessors.

The Prime Minister’s entourage seeks to convince [Israelis] of exactly the opposite. According to this line, the public is supposed to see an orderly historical process in front of them, one that is progressing at a satisfactory pace, through close American-Israeli coordination, on the way to a result that has not yet been fully revealed to the public but is, so to speak, under control. Herein lies the sophistication of the narrative promoted by Netanyahu’s entourage.

It does not rely primarily on refuting the facts revealed in briefings and reports, but on a consistent effort to change the language of interpretation. Instead of entering into a frontal confrontation with the very existence of difficulties, he gives them a different name, a different tone, a different meaning … What could be interpreted as an unwanted expansion of the campaign is wrapped up as a natural continuation of a calculated move. This is not a contradiction of the facts, but rather a takeover of their meaning.

The most obvious example is the Strait of Hormuz. In the picture painted by several inside sources, the very need to form a naval coalition, to deploy escorts for ships, to prepare over time, and to allocate additional resources shows that the problem is deeper than previously assumed. Iran may have been severely damaged in its conventional capabilities, but it still manages to threaten one of the world’s most sensitive energy corridors, make the campaign more expensive, and force the Americans and their partners into a complicated preparedness. In the Prime Minister’s environment, the same reality takes on a completely different packaging. Not a difficulty that requires reinforcement, but a sequence of proactive steps taken according to an orderly logic. Thus, without changing the facts themselves, the impression they leave behind completely changes. Instead of a picture of a problem that is gradually becoming clear in all its complexity, one gets the feeling of a managed, almost programmed process …

The same mechanism is also at work in relation to Lebanon. According to briefings from diplomatic sources and American officials, the Lebanese arena is not particularly good news for the Americans … This is a seemingly small detail, but politically it is crucial. Once the public adopts this language, it ceases to see another front imposed on Israel, and begins to see an almost welcome expansion of the field of action. The question of the relationship between Trump and Netanyahu is going through the same process. From the picture reflected by sources familiar with the details … there is deep cooperation, but there is ... friction. There are overlapping goals, but there is no complete identity of interests. There is coordination, and alongside it are various assessments of price, pace, risk, and the path forward. In the version of the Prime Minister’s people, all this complexity almost disappears. There, a story of almost complete harmony is built, of two leaders who understand each other deeply, and of a relationship in which the Prime Minister does not appear to be pushing Trump too far, but rather as helping him realize a move that needed a precise Israeli push. This, of course, serves a clear political need: to erase any impression of friction, and certainly any suspicion that Netanyahu is once again identifying a personal and political window of opportunity in a war whose costs are increasing.

This is also true of the way in which Trump’s own image is shaped. US sources portray a president who is dealing with a real gap between the initial rhetoric and the cumulative weight of the campaign ... where the question of “how to finish” is sometimes more difficult than the question of “how to start” … [Trump] is presented as someone who operates within an overall strategic concept, as someone who sees Iran, the energy market, China, Russia and the Gulf as part of a single system. This framing has a clear function: it elevates the war from a dangerous military event to a major geopolitical project, one within which it is much easier to swallow local difficulties, delays, complications and uncertainty.

In this sense, the fight over the narrative is almost as important as the discussion of the results of the campaign itself. Governments do not necessarily fall because of long wars … What is much harder to survive is the moment when the public begins to suspect that reality is much more complicated than the story they are told. There, all the truly sensitive questions are reopened: what are the real goals of the campaign ... have changed along the way; what is the relationship between Israeli needs and the American calculation, and how far Israel has gone along a trajectory where it is unclear whether [Israel] has a clear political end point.

This is why Netanyahu and his entourage are now investing such a significant effort in the explanatory layer. Not because the facts are negligible, but because the public is almost never exposed to the facts as they are; it is exposed to their framing. Sources involved in the details point to military achievements that are accompanied by accumulating costs, to significant successes that still do not close the campaign, and to question marks that are only becoming heavier. Netanyahu’s entourage is seeking to establish a different consciousness, without “sorrow,” devoid of complexity. The distance between the two versions is the gap between a description of a complex reality, which does not easily converge into a convenient title, and an attempt to shape it into a clean, precise, and easily digestible victory story.

‘Senior [Israeli] Political Figure claims 'Iran is weakening — Overthrow of Iranian regime possible if fighting continues’ (Anna Barsky, Ma’ariv, 17 March):

A senior [Israeli] political figure, refer[ing] to latest developments in the war against Iran, presents a broad range of goals that Israel is setting for the war … The overthrow of the regime, he said, is not a theoretical scenario, but a real possibility, if Israel persists in the military action. According to the senior figure, Israeli action is not focused only on immediately damaging Tehran’s military capabilities, but also on shaping the strategic reality that follows … Israel is systematically operating against the top brass of the Iranian regime, while at the same time striving to achieve five key goals: damaging the weapons industries, completing the destruction of the nuclear program, creating conditions for regime change, operating in the maritime arena around the Strait of Hormuz, and denying Iran the ability to use the Strait again in the future as a means of pressure. “The concept is to reach “the heads of the regime one by one,” said the senior political official … “We are catching the heads of the regime one by one. They fled to the tents, so we kill them there.” The unusual statement reflects the message that Israel is trying to convey at this stage: expanding the campaign beyond infrastructure and formations to the command and political echelons of the Iranian regime.

The first target, according to the Israeli official, is a broad attack on Iran’s weapons industries, especially on its ballistic missile system. If in the past, attention was focused on critical components of the production lines … now [Israeli is targeting] the factories themselves ... to temporarily disrupt production capabilities, but to cause deep and lasting damage to the infrastructure that allows Iran to renew its arsenal and develop advanced weapons.

The second goal is “completely destroying the nuclear program”. According to the source, this is a comprehensive effort designed to ensure that Iran will not be able to maintain a nuclear infrastructure that will allow it to advance in the future. Israel sees this as a fundamental goal of the war, not only in terms of removing an immediate threat, but also as a crucial element in shaping the regional balance of power for years to come.

A third, particularly sensitive goal is creating the conditions for regime change. The source did not specify how Israel seeks to achieve this in practice, but the very fact of openly setting this goal indicates a much broader concept than that of a limited military campaign. No longer a punitive or deterrent move alone, but an attempt to influence the internal political structure in Iran and the survivability of its leadership.

The fourth target concerns the Strait of Hormuz. According to the source, Israel is working with the US to assist in [this] effort ...

The fifth goal, according to the source, is perhaps the broadest of all -- to deprive the “new Iran” of ... the possibility of regaining leverage in the future. In this framework, long-term solutions are also being examined, including infrastructure alternatives and alternative pipelines, designed to reduce dependence on transit through the Strait.

From Israel’s perspective, this is not just about managing the current campaign, but about shaping a new regional order in which Iran, in whatever form of government it takes, will have less ability to threaten trade and energy routes. The political level is therefore presenting a picture of an ambitious and multidimensional campaign: military, political, economic and strategic. If these are indeed the goals guiding decision-making, then from Israel’s perspective the war is not intended to end with just a targeted attack on Iran’s capabilities, but rather with a profound change in the rules of the game against it.

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