Strategic Perspectives from Iran: War & the New Geopolitical Order in West Asia

A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations from Iran, 13 May 2026

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei sets five conditions to be met before entering talks on the nuclear file /

Iran’s Two-Stage Proposal to End the War; Demands End to War on Lebanon & Withdrawal from Hormuz /

‘Restraint is Over’; ‘The best course is to make concessions. You must get used to the new regional order’ /

Iran’s Strategy — ‘Neither War nor Surrender’ /

Iranian Naval Blockade on UAE Ports — Iran’s Counter-Response to the US Blockade /

“Asymmetric Naval Warfare” — How Iran defeated Operation Project Freedom

STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS, CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS —

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei sets five conditions to be met before entering talks on Iran’s nuclear file (12 May):

1. Ending the war on all fronts in the region, including Lebanon and Gaza.

2. The lifting of all economic sanctions imposed on Iran.

3. Releasing all Iran’s frozen funds held in foreign banks.

4. Committing to paying reparations for damage and losses resulting from the war.

5. Recognizing Iran’s sovereign right over the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran Defiant: Two-Stage Proposal to End War; Demands End to War on Lebanon & Withdrawal from Hormuz (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar, pro-resistance Lebanese daily)

Mediators have informed the Americans: Iran considers an end to the war on Lebanon and a withdrawal [from Hormuz] to be binding conditions before discussing the nuclear programme … What Iran sent to the US via the Pakistani mediator was not a proposal open to negotiation, as is customary … Meanwhile, the fighting continues in Lebanon, and Iran continues to prepare for the possibility of a return to a new and even fiercer round of war with the US and Israel. Regardless of the differences in their assessment of the situation, Iran and Hezbollah are acting on the premise that there is no turning back, and that if the confrontation continues or escalates, they must do whatever is necessary first to thwart military operations, and then to prevent any exploitation of an escalation in the political arena.

Just as the resistance is raising the stakes despite Israel’s escalation ... the Iranian side considers itself already in a position of having paid the price; consequently, it will not remain open to any settlement whose terms differ from what has been proposed. Should the war resume, it will be difficult for Iran to maintain the position it has communicated to the mediators ... and the entire region will then face a different reality … It has become clear to the Arab Gulf states that, should the war resume and the US and Israel bomb Iran’s infrastructure, Tehran will set its sights on eliminating the US military presence in the region …

Iran’s response to the US proposals is consistent with [its] view that the [war’s] outcome … since the end of February does not allow Washington to impose its conditions in any solution, and that all the developments resulting from the war have become, for Tehran, part of the hard facts that cannot be bypassed or erased … Iran believes that the new political and military shifts cannot be treated as if they had not happened.

Therefore, the Iranians have agreed to a formula for an agreement based on a two-stage process: the first focuses on ending the state of war with all its requirements and managing the fallout from the conflict, whilst the second stage is dedicated to addressing the outstanding issues between the two sides dating back to before the outbreak of the war … [the Iranians] say that what they consider logical, realistic and fair is the declaration of a comprehensive ceasefire, not only in Iran, but also in Lebanon, Iraq and the rest of the region, given that these fronts flared up at the same time and within the same context … On this basis, Iran regards ending the state of war across the entire region as a prerequisite for any sustainable solution.

From Iran’s perspective, declaring an end to the war has clear mechanisms. The first is a complete cessation of all forms of military operations by all parties to the conflict. Then, as a complementary step, military forces are to be withdrawn from the Gulf, in parallel with Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon. At the same time, the new circumstances imposed by the war must be addressed, including the lifting of the US blockade on Iranian ports, in exchange for Iran’s declaration that it will remove military restrictions on navigation in the Persian Gulf, with all parties endorsing the new protocol for the management of the Strait of Hormuz. This protocol is still being formulated, between Iran and the Sultanate of Oman on the one hand, and the states and entities benefiting from shipping traffic in the Strait on the other.

In practice, if this were to happen, the first phase of the solution would conclude with a declaration of intent confirming the US and Iranian sides’ desire to reach an understanding on a permanent agreement governing their relationship. This declaration is intended to serve as a prelude to launching the second phase of the agreement, as Tehran sees it, which is based on opening comprehensive negotiations addressing the nuclear issue, outstanding regional issues between the two sides, and the nature of their bilateral relations, with these negotiations to be conducted within a specific timeframe of one month ...

Lebanon appears once again to be at the heart of the negotiations. According to what is being discussed among the parties concerned, Lebanon’s name features in every negotiation session, in every document sent, and in every response prepared ... Tehran has confirmed to the mediators – whether from Pakistan, Qatar, Oman or elsewhere – that the initial ceasefire agreement also covered Lebanon, and that there would be a complete withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from occupied Lebanese territory … The Iranians consider that the US administration bears responsibility for Israel’s failure to adhere to this agreement, and that no new understanding can be trusted unless Washington commits in advance to forcing Israel to cease fire … The mediators have repeatedly reminded the US side that Israel has failed in Lebanon, and that, just as it made erroneous assessments regarding Iran, it has also misjudged the situation in Lebanon. Hezbollah has demonstrated a great capacity to continue operations on the ground and achieve significant results, whilst Israel, by contrast, resorts to a policy of killing and destruction ... All talk of US restrictions on Israel is seen as having no real significance ... because what Israel is suffering is linked to what is happening on the ground, not to the level of political pressure on it. As for what Israel excels at, it is continuing to kill and destroy. Accordingly, preliminary information reaching Beirut ... suggests that the United States has become convinced that ending the war with Iran cannot be achieved without also ending the war on Lebanon … Today, Washington finds itself facing a major challenge. If it truly wishes to reach a solution with Iran, it is obliged to impose a ceasefire on the Israeli war against Lebanon. But we may be facing the traditional American balancing act, which aims to exploit any ceasefire in Lebanon to advance its political agenda within the country … — how to turn the ceasefire into a political gift bestowed upon Aoun, Nawaf Salam’s government, and the pro-American faction in Beirut, so that they may capitalise on the moment to impose political, military and security realities that serve the shared vision of the pillars of power on the one hand, and the US and Israel on the other, a vision based on ending the resistance and disarming it.

UPDATES —

Ali Akbar Velayati, Senior Adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader and former Foreign Minister:

“Trump says that ‘Iran will be laughing no longer’ and speaks of a ceasefire with ‘great brilliance’. But Trump, while ambiguously threatening Iran with nuclear weapons, appears to believe the Pentagon’s lies aimed at concealing the heavy casualty figures among American soldiers. Mr. Trump, never imagine that by exploiting the calm we are showing today, you will enter Beijing triumphantly. First, learn the alphabet of the new geopolitical order in West Asia. We defeated you on the battlefield; therefore, never imagine that you will be victorious in diplomacy.”

Ebrahim Razei, spokesperson for Iranian Parliament’s Foreign Policy and National Security Committee: ‘Restraint is over’; ‘The best course is to make concessions. You must get used to the new regional order’:

“Starting today, our restraint has come to an end. Any attack on our vessels will be met with a heavy and decisive Iranian response against US ships and bases … Time is working against the Americans. It is in their interest not to act foolishly and sink deeper into the quagmire they have entered. The best course is to surrender and make concessions. You must get used to the new regional order”.

Spokesperson, Iran’s National Security Commission, citing the Head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization:

Nuclear technology is not on the agenda of the negotiations. Enrichment is not negotiable. Iran’s nuclear industry activities have been peaceful and will remain peaceful. Necessary measures for the protection of nuclear centers and assets have been planned and implemented.

Esmaeil Baqaei, Spokesperson for Iran’s Foreign Ministry:

If Israel makes a mistake and gives us a pretext, Iran’s armed forces will make the best possible use of it.

Iran’s strategy — “Neither War” nor “Surrender” (Mostafa Najafi):

It is unlikely that the negotiations will reach a conclusion, because the gaps are too wide; because the security project concerning Iran that has been underway since the [June 2025] war is a massive and grand project that the US and Israel cannot achieve through the path of agreement. The strategy of “either war” or “surrender” on their part will continue unabated. In response, Iran, despite its war readiness, will pursue a strategy of “neither war” nor “surrender.” [Meanwhile], the UAE has committed a grave mistake and has turned itself into a buffer zone for the conflict.

Iranian Naval Blockade on UAE Ports — Iran’s counter-response to the US blockade (Hossein Pak):

The IRGC issued a statement expanding the scope of Iranian armed forces’ control over the Strait of Hormuz. This statement means that the eastern coast of the UAE, in addition to the Omani coast south of the Strait of Hormuz, falls within the prohibited zone to the east, and no ship or oil tanker has the right to approach this port or oil facility. This means cutting off oil exports from Fujairah and imposing a naval blockade on all ports of the United Arab Emirates east and west of the Strait of Hormuz. The Revolutionary Guard’s expansion of the prohibited zone east and west of the Strait of Hormuz has led to the imposition of a naval blockade on all ports of the United Arab Emirates. Additionally, the Fujairah oil facility, located east of the strait and designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, has been excluded from the oil export route … The new boundaries ... which include blockading all ports of what is known as the “United Hebrew Emirates” [is] a step that constitutes a balanced counter-response to the naval blockade plan adopted by the enemy.

OTHER COMMENTARY —

How Iran Transformed the Conflict into a Regional War (Ali Hashem, Al-Jazeera Senior Political Reporter):

From the [outset of the] Pakistan talks, Mojtaba Khamenei made it clear to the officials that Iran will not negotiate on terms set by others. And this is exactly what has been adopted since the war broke out. Washington and Tel Aviv wanted a limited war with results reaching the level of regime change. What Iran did was to transform it directly into a regional war. Moreover, the targets were specific: the nuclear program, the missiles, and regional influence. Iran responded with an out-of-the-box card by closing Hormuz and turning military pressure into a global economic crisis.

Every time Washington sets the rules of the game, Tehran changes the playing field. History always carries an explanation, in a context perhaps different, for the reality. Kissinger spent years in the Vietnam War before realizing that the North Vietnamese fought largely for time, endurance, and the gradual collapse of American political will. Tehran is walking the same line.

Trump is in a bind; if Kissinger were still alive, he would recognize it immediately. He cannot end the war, nor can he exit without losing face. And the longer it drags on, the pain is no longer just Iranian; oil markets, shipping, supply chains. Other economies have begun to bleed as well. Iran’s bet is clear: time works against American political cycles, Hormuz turns sanctions into a double-edged sword, and the outcomes after October 7 have not yet been settled. Iran is not seeking to win this round. It only wants to remain resilient when America needs an exit. Kissinger erred in Vietnam not in escalation, but in his delusion that the other side shared his definition of victory. It seems Tehran has absorbed this lesson well.

“Asymmetric Naval Warfare”: How Iran defeated Operation Project Freedom (Hassan Haidar, Al-Akhbar):

The naval confrontation between Iran and the US can no longer be interpreted according to the traditional rules of classical naval warfare … Setbacks to American plans aimed at securing freedom of navigation and imposing complete naval dominance under the banners of “freedom” and “humanity” have reaffirmed that the battle in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz is governed by the logic of “asymmetric naval warfare”. Through this, Iran seeks to change the rules of engagement, rather than engaging in a costly conventional confrontation that it might lose in terms of firepower, numerical superiority, and technological capabilities … [Iran’s] gamble is based on turning American strengths into elements of attrition. Within this framework, Tehran now possesses winning cards for managing the naval confrontation.

Perhaps the foremost of these cards is the tactic of “intensive attacks” using fast and light boats … Second is the complete integration of coast and sea into a single theatre of operations [creating] a kind of permanent “fire umbrella” over the Persian Gulf and Hormuz -- the objective is not necessarily to sink American ships, but rather to deny them complete freedom of maneuver. The third element [is] naval mines -- the most effective and least costly deterrent tools [which] grants Iran an ability to exert influence that extends beyond direct military action, by establishing safe shipping lanes, just as it does today within its territorial waters.

[Fourth] Iran relies on “operational ambiguity” as a deterrent … [Fifth] linking the military arena to the global economic sphere. [And finally] Iran’s naval strategy ... is accompanied by cyberattacks on maritime infrastructure, media campaigns aimed at amplifying the psychological and political impact of the confrontation … [and] a clear Iranian reliance on time as a crucial strategic element — a strategy of “gradual attrition,” prolonging tensions and raising political and economic costs over time, creating mounting pressure on the global economy and on calculations of policymakers in Washington.

China supports continuation of UNIFIL as a “containment force”, not authorized to disarm Hezbollah by force (Michel Nasr, Ad-Diyyar):

Most analysts and observers agree that the war waged by the American-Israeli alliance against Tehran is, in reality, a disguised confrontation between the United States and China to define the boundaries of economic, military, and political influence in the new Middle East, whose core focus is energy resources. Within this context, the statements of the Chinese representative to the UN stood out. He announced a few days ago the need to reconsider the UN Security Council resolution to revoke the mandate of the UN forces in southern Lebanon and withdraw them completely by the end of 2026. This position aligns with those of other parties, most notably France, although the reasons and objectives of the two countries differ.

Diplomatic sources following the situation believe that Beijing, as a rising player in the region, seeks to redefine its presence in conflict zones, including southern Lebanon this time, but with tools different from the traditional Western model. It prefers to operate under the umbrella of international legitimacy, avoiding direct involvement in the conflict, considering UNIFIL the ideal entity to achieve a balance that allows it a calculated field presence and growing political influence at a relatively low cost. The sources added that China’s support for the continuation of UNIFIL as a “containment force, not a decisive one,” and therefore not authorized to disarm Hezbollah by force, falls within its strategy of balancing American influence and securing a stable environment for its economic interests …

Strong Chinese pressure to reconsider the UNSC resolution, supported by Russia, and aligned with the French and British stances, could lead to one of two outcomes: Renewing the mandate for a new term on the grounds that the Lebanese Army is not yet fully prepared to assume its responsibilities south of the Litani River, a position reinforced by the Lebanese government’s stance. Forming an alternative mission is an option if the decision to end UNIFIL’s mandate is insisted upon. China would demand a smaller “political and technical monitoring” mission to ensure the UN flag remains on the Blue Line, thus preventing Western powers from dominating the region. This would provide China with a legitimate basis for a permanent seat at the table in any negotiations concerning the future security of the Eastern Mediterranean.

From ‘Decisive Victory’ to ‘Risk Management’ (Ali Haider, Al-Akhbar):

Having begun the war against Iran with high hopes of a decisive victory, the options now before Washington all seem far removed from those objectives, to the extent that it now appears as though the primary aim of the war is to reopen the Strait of Hormuz … [and an implicit acknowledgement of] the inability to impose a fundamental change in Iran’s behaviour or strategic structure. [The US’] hypothesis [on the war’s trajectory] collided with a completely different reality. For Tehran, the pressures have become part of a long-term strategic environment … — rather than bringing about a change in behaviour, the instruments of pressure became part of the equation managed by Tehran, which combines strategic patience, cost-bearing, and conflict management based on a strategic vision centred on ideological and political constants. There is effectively no longer any prospect of achieving the war’s stated objectives, but only of preventing the situation from deteriorating into a catastrophic scenario …

The main dilemma facing the US -- ‘How do we prevent Iran from reaching the threshold of nuclear weapons production in the near future, even if it does not wish to produce them?’ -- reflects a belated realisation that the conflict cannot be resolved under the terms on which it began.

In light of this reality, three main scenarios are emerging, none of which is likely to achieve the war’s objectives, but all of which reflect a shift from seeking a decisive victory to risk management, to prevent the impasse from turning into a catastrophic scenario: First, the scenario of a partial agreement that imposes specific restrictions on the nuclear programme without actually dismantling it, which leaves Iran a wide margin for manoeuvre … Second, the continuation of a state of ‘managed stalemate’, where mutual pressure continues without a full-scale explosion, whilst Iran continues to develop its capabilities; however, the timeframe for this option remains limited, due to its dangerous consequences for both sides, particularly the economic ones. Thirdly: a return to the option of war, which has proven to be of limited utility [due to] its high cost and the potential for escalation make its recurrence more dangerous and less likely to yield different results.

Against this backdrop, Israel’s concerns are mounting, having built a significant part of its regional strategy on the premise that the strategic environment could be altered … Today it finds itself facing a different reality, as the overthrow of the regime seems further away than ever, whilst its decisive containment is no longer an option available within the current toolkit. Conversely, all the alternative scenarios pose direct risks to Israeli national security; an inadequate agreement means Iran remains on the threshold of nuclear capability, with improved economic resources and the ability to rebuild its regional influence. Maintaining the status quo equates to an unstable environment, with gradual progress in the nuclear programme and an accumulation of missile capabilities. As for a return to war, this would entail the possibility of multiple fronts opening up, exposing Israel’s hinterland to unprecedented pressure. Here, the concerns relate not only to the immediate threat, but also to the erosion of the ability to reshape the Middle East in accordance with the Israeli vision. Instead of a more submissive regional environment, a more complex reality is emerging, in which powers overlap and the ability of actors to impose decisive outcomes is waning.

Minor edits have been made for clarity during translation.

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