The ‘Management of Hegemony’ — Coerced Normalisation?; What will Saudi Arabia choose?
A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations in West Asia -- analysis & reports from the Arabic/ regional press (30 Oct 2025)
Saudi Normalization would threaten a Regional Rupture: Riyadh’s choice & three possible trajectories /
Surveillance & Cyber Collaboration — Normalization’s dark underbelly /
US Envoy Barrack’s Ultimatum to Lebanon: ‘Normalization or War’ /
Lebanon’s Post-Ceasefire Trap /
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings alleges Israeli War Crimes in Lebanon as it continues killing civilians /
Abu Mazen appoints his successor — Hussein al-Sheikh — “at the request of the US”
CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS & STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS
Saudi Arabia’s path to normalization threatens a regional rupture: Riyadh’s choice & three possible trajectories (Fouad Ibrahim, The Cradle):
On 17 October, Trump [said], “I hope to see Saudi Arabia go in ... I think when Saudi Arabia goes in, everybody goes in.” The statement was calculated to reignite Washington’s normalization push and reassert Riyadh’s place at the heart of the US-Israeli regional alliance plan ... Including Saudi Arabia would crown [Trump’s] foreign policy legacy and fundamentally alter the Arab political order. But the costs may be steeper than the gains. In the months preceding Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, US-mediated talks between Riyadh and Tel Aviv were approaching a breakthrough. The kingdom sought US security guarantees, access to advanced weapons systems, and backing for its civilian nuclear ambitions. The Israeli side saw in Riyadh a historic opportunity. But Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on 7 October 2023, and Tel Aviv’s ensuing carpet-bombing of Gaza, derailed the entire process. Saudi officials were forced to retreat in the face of overwhelming public outrage across the Muslim world. Trump’s renewed confidence, suggests the framework ... was never truly discarded. It has merely been shelved, pending a more favorable political climate … If the kingdom normalizes ties with Tel Aviv, a domino effect across Arab and Muslim nations could follow. For Israel, this would be the ultimate regional prize. For Washington, it would cement an American-led bloc from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, aimed squarely at containing both Iran and China …
Several factors continue to draw Riyadh toward normalization. Both Saudi Arabia and Israel view Iran and the Axis of Resistance as their primary regional adversaries. This strategic alignment has not been fully undone by the 2023 China-brokered thaw between Tehran and Riyadh. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 plan to diversify its economy sees potential in Israeli sectors like defense technology and cybersecurity. Trump’s preference for transactional diplomacy means a grand bargain offering defense pacts, nuclear cooperation, or substantial investment flows could appeal to Saudi ambitions. And within the kingdom, a younger, globally attuned population may be less ideologically opposed to normalization – if it is presented as part of a broader modernization drive. However, surveys [indicate] that a majority of Saudis oppose normalizing ties with Israel.
Normalization is not without peril. On the contrary, its very success could destabilize the region. Any Saudi–Israeli deal that sidelines Palestinian rights would be seen as a betrayal of the kingdom’s religious mandate and leadership role [and] could shatter the kingdom’s legitimacy in the wider Muslim world. The Axis of Resistance … would seize on the normalization to portray it as an alliance of apostates and occupiers, fueling more intense and frequent confrontations. By committing to a volatile US-Israeli partnership, Riyadh risks entanglement in wider conflicts, undermining its strategic autonomy and exposing itself to blowback it cannot control. If normalization ushers in a US–Israel–Saudi security architecture, the implications for West Asia would be profound. Tel Aviv would contribute intelligence and military prowess, Washington would provide oversight and guarantees, and Riyadh would bankroll the venture. But this alliance would be read in Tehran as yet another encirclement strategy, prompting the Islamic Republic to accelerate its missile and nuclear capabilities. The region could slide into an arms race that undermines development, drains budgets, and magnifies the risks of miscalculation. Moreover, such a pivot could unravel Saudi Arabia’s recent diplomatic gains – including its rapprochement with Iran, Iraq, and Oman-mediated talks in Yemen – and alienate … China and Russia. The net result could be diminished regional influence and increased dependence on the west … In this sense, the very security guarantees sought through the trilateral axis could paradoxically generate new forms of insecurity – both internal and regional – making the kingdom’s stability increasingly contingent on external actors and volatile power dynamics.
Surveillance state: Normalization’s dark underbelly: One of the least discussed aspects of normalization is cyber collaboration. Israel’s role as a global surveillance hub and Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets could converge to create a formidable digital control grid. Such a system – integrating spyware, predictive policing, and AI surveillance – would strengthen the US-led intelligence grid across West Asia, enhancing early-warning systems, missile defense coordination, and digital containment of the Axis of Resistance … The normalization process could thus serve as a legitimizing cover for what might become the most sophisticated surveillance apparatus in the Arab world. Regionally, a Saudi–Israeli cyber partnership would alarm neighboring states, particularly Iran and Qatar, which would perceive it as a threat to their own sovereignty and national security. The likely response would be the acceleration of rival cyber alliances, possibly involving Russia, China, or Turkiye – ushering in a new digital Cold War in the Persian Gulf.
Riyadh’s choices: Three possible trajectories: The Saudi leadership now faces three broad options. First, conditional normalization, where recognition of Israel is tied to measurable progress on Palestinian statehood and sovereignty … Second, incremental engagement (soft normalization), involving quiet cooperation below the threshold of formal recognition that gradually lays the groundwork for future deals. Third, strategic hedging, in which Riyadh continues to balance between US pressure and regional diplomacy, keeping normalization in reserve as a bargaining chip … Unless normalization is tied to justice for Palestine, it will be remembered not as peace, but as betrayal.
US Envoy Barrack’s Ultimatum to Lebanon: Normalization or War (Al-Akhbar):
Beirut has become a revolving door for foreign envoys this week as threats from Tel Aviv to bomb Lebanon intensify. Representatives from the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Arab League have been delivering the same blunt message: the Lebanese ruling class must act, Hezbollah’s weapons must be addressed, and a direct deal with Israel cannot be postponed any longer … Soon, US Mediator Barrack is expected to land in Beirut to deliver his ultimatum … [his] warning is very clear: either Lebanon accepts US-backed negotiations with Israel, or Israel will act on its own and no one will stop it. The change in Washington’s tone underscores a swing in its role: from mediation to upfront management of hegemony. [This is] part of a coordinated pressure campaign aiming to satisfy Israeli demands that go beyond mere disarmament. Tel Aviv now wants Lebanon’s integration into a post-Gaza regional order. Lebanon is being nudged towards the same model shaping Syria’s deal with Israel: normalization under pressure ... The diplomatic rush reflects a broader regional strategy. Since the Gaza ceasefire and the Sharm el-Sheikh summit, Washington and its allies have moved on to the next stage of containment. Lebanon is the testing ground. Here, the US hopes to limit Iran’s influence without triggering a direct conflict with Tehran. The plan is to neutralize Hezbollah, fold Lebanon into a US-managed “stability” framework, and use pressure to enforce compliance … Lebanon is being nudged towards the same model shaping Syria’s deal with Israel: normalization under pressure.
Negotiated disarmament remains unrealistic … so [Netanyahu’s] aim is to force both Damascus and Beirut to sign onto the Abraham Accords and score an internal political win ahead of the 2026 Knesset elections. And he appears willing to achieve his goal at any cost, even if it meant broadening strikes in Lebanon … The Lebanese ruling class is caught in the middle. President Aoun reportedly told visiting delegations that any attempt to forcibly remove Hezbollah’s arsenal would trigger a civil war – a stance that no longer convinces Washington … For the US, it maintains pressure on Iran without any direct confrontation. For Israel, it provides internal leverage for Netanyahu. For Arab mediators, it is an opportunity to demonstrate their influence. And for the Lebanese people, it is yet another cycle of waiting, where every new ultimatum drives the country closer to collapse.
Is a New Lebanon War Imminent? (Michael Young, Carnegie):
Observers are assuming that a new Lebanon war is imminent … In recent weeks, the Israelis have engaged in actions that might indicate they’re readying for a military option in Lebanon. Just over a week ago, they organized maneuvers in northern Galilee, along the Lebanese border, amid mounting claims that Hezbollah was rearming. Almost daily, Israeli drones are killing Lebanese whom the Israelis allege are Hezbollah operatives, though it’s eminently clear that many [are] civilians ... Israel is focused on making life unbearable for southerners, including limiting their access to their own olive groves, bombing damaged homes at the first sign the owners are trying to make repairs, and creating conditions making tobacco cultivation, a vital agricultural sector for inhabitants of the border region, all but impossible. The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions, Morris Tidball-Binz, told AFP, “Unless there is compelling evidence that those civilian objects have dual [military] objectives ... the strikes are illegal. The killings resulting from the attacks violate the right to life and also the principles of precaution and proportionality and, in my opinion, also amount to war crimes” …
Israel has more or less imposed the reality it wants in southern Lebanon, and has full U.S. support in this ... Given [this,] a new conflict whose outcome would be uncertain at best may not necessarily lead to an improvement over what the Israelis have today. Israel completely dominates the land and airspace of southern Lebanon, enjoys U.S. backing through the so-called Mechanism supervising the bogus ceasefire in place, and will see its clout increase now that it has succeeded, with the Americans, in terminating the mandate of [UNIFIL] in Lebanon in December 2026. Liquidating UNIFIL has long been an aim of Israel and its friends in the US [to ensure no] international eyes in southern Lebanon … Whether this would be used to impose a peace settlement on Beirut, or transform Israel’s occupation into something permanent, is a matter of conjecture, but without UN peacekeepers on hand, all options would remain open for the Israelis … [Israel’s] army is exhausted from the campaign in Gaza … What precisely can Israeli forces do in Lebanon? If the argument is that they could occupy more land, perhaps up to the Litani River and even beyond, that would mean they intend to risk getting bogged down in a major land operation that would only revive Hezbollah’s fortunes and weaken the party’s Lebanese foes. And for what? ... Hezbollah only really poses a threat to Israel in the context of an effective regional alliance among pro-Iran forces. The Israelis are aware of this, even if they have an interest in playing up the Hezbollah threat with Washington … Israel does not appear to be under great pressure to resume a war in Lebanon when the ceasefire in place offers it many advantages and Hezbollah still has the limited wherewithal to threaten Israeli territory. On their own, these factors do not guarantee that a conflict won’t happen. But they suggest there is no overriding Israeli reason to mobilize its forces right away. For now, Israel’s main concern remains Iran, which is reconstituting its military capacities. Hezbollah remains a side show, one that the Israelis may yet prefer to resolve by crippling Tehran.
Lebanon’s Post-Ceasefire Trap (Maysam Rizk, Al-Akhbar):
The Israeli war in Lebanon was nominally halted on November 27. The political pressure that followed rested on a single illusion: that Hezbollah was collapsing and ripe for an internal finish-off. In the aftermath, Washington and its allies moved quickly to shape a compliant Lebanese government — one whose agenda aims squarely at disarming the Resistance. The political maneuvers produced a docile ruling class … [but] the ultimate goal soon became obvious: Hezbollah is only the entry point. Lebanon itself is the target — its sovereignty, political identity, and very existence as a state. Like Syria and other countries seen as threats to Israel, Lebanon is to be neutralized at any cost, even if it means destroying it.
Israel emerged from the war with no strategic gains, only setbacks with unintended consequences. Instead of eliminating Hezbollah, the campaign pushed it to reorganize. The group is now rebuilding its ranks and restoring operational readiness. Israel knows this, which is why it is racing for a deal under current conditions. Israel has dropped all restraint. Its deliberate targeting of civilians and resistance leaders aimed to break Lebanon’s will and push it toward an “agreement” stripped of leverage and dignity … After every war, Israel acts as if it has won and can set the terms. Yet it has never secured everything it sought; the balance of power on the ground has always shaped the outcome. This time, Israel seeks to flip that equation and impose surrender terms on Lebanon from a position of unilateral force … The danger now lies in ignoring the Resistance’s endurance and rushing into what could become Lebanon’s most humiliating deal … Today, Israel demands far more than it obtained in the November 2024 arrangements, emboldened by a US green light to act freely … PM Salam’s government appears focused primarily on paving the way for Israel’s demands ... The first alarming sign is talk of relinquishing Shebaa Farms by reclassifying them as Syrian territory, a move that would make it easier for Israel to claim them later through a deal with Damascus. External pressure is intensifying on two fronts. Politically, US envoys ... are pushing to expand the “mechanism committee” to include Lebanese and Israeli officials, effectively turning indirect talks into direct ones as with Syria. Militarily, Israel continues to threaten renewed war — both openly and through diplomatic channels … For Israel and its Abraham Accords partners, war may be the quickest way to force Lebanon’s surrender without any guarantee of Israeli restraint, as history has shown. Others argue that another war, however costly, might be the only way out of the current paralysis. They believe Israel will stop only when it begins to pay a real price again.
Hizbullah: ‘We don’t want war, but we are ready for defense‘ (Al-Akhbar):
Hezbollah’s Secretary-General, Sheikh Naim Qassem, [has said] the Resistance is in a state of complete readiness to defend itself should the enemy decide to launch a large-scale war. Qassem cautioned: “be content with the ceasefire agreement, because it achieves everyone’s objectives”. “Regardless of the level of recovery that Hezbollah has achieved, we are a Resistance movement, and we say before the whole world: we, as a resistance, are ready to defend ourselves … we have no decision to launch a battle, nor a decision to initiate fighting.” Qassem explained that “from 2006 to 2023, deterrence was based on displaying a surplus of power, and this method proved effective. Today, however, we have a different tactic. We do not display a surplus of power, nor do we possess a surplus of power. We operate in a normal manner, and we have enough power for our needs, so why would we show more than we have?”
Is Israel preparing a “hard” security zone across south Lebanon & south Syria -- international in form, Israeli in practice? (Toni Issa, Al-Joumhouria):
In the complex chess game of the Middle East, Israel is seeking to redraw security maps according to its own interests. In this context, its recent, increasingly systematic reports about “arms smuggling from Syria and its south to Hezbollah” should not be seen merely as an intelligence display, but rather as a cornerstone of a deeper strategy: preparing the ground to link southern Lebanon and southern Syria together, whether in the next escalation or in the settlement that is supposed to result from it … When Israel repeatedly announces the existence of Iranian networks operating a land supply line to Lebanon, through the northern Bekaa or Mount Hermon, it is preparing the international legal cover that allows it to carry out pre-emptive strikes and military operations outside the area south of the Litani River, and deep within Syrian and Lebanese territory, without accountability. This has been observed to be accelerating in recent days. These successive reports aim to undermine any Lebanese effort, including the Lebanese army’s plan to clear the area south of the Litani River of Hezbollah’s weapons, by suggesting that any security arrangements concerning Lebanon alone, without the Syrian side, will remain merely “patchwork” and ineffective, because the Syrian border will remain open and constitute a lifeline for Hezbollah. In other words, “The two fronts cannot be separated, and our security cannot be achieved through partial arrangements limited to one without the other.”
In practical terms, Israel is tearing apart the idea of the “Blue Line” with Lebanon … In terms of political outcomes, Israel will argue that any security zone intended to guarantee its northern borders, or any demarcation or separation arrangements, cannot be limited to Lebanon alone, but must address the Lebanese-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli borders in a single package, i.e., imposing a joint “security belt” based on similar, consistent, and integrated security arrangements ... It is most likely that Israel is working to establish a model similar to the “security zone” it long maintained in southern Lebanon, but this time in partnership with Syria, and in a new format that aligns with the requirements of the promised settlements with both countries. This “hard” security zone, the first few kilometers after the border, will serve as a buffer zone, or a demilitarized zone under strict control, international in form and Israeli in practice … At a deeper level, Israel is preparing the ground for future negotiations on security arrangements. If it succeeds in establishing the concept that the Lebanese and Syrian “souths” constitute a single front, this will give it a wide negotiating margin, as it will make the negotiations “regional” rather than “bilateral.” In other words, the Israeli accusations of arms smuggling across the Syrian border into Lebanon, particularly from the south and Mount Hermon, are intended to lay the groundwork for future security arrangements … Israel is using the issue of smuggling as a pretext to establish a regional security system that serves its supreme interests, namely, creating a “defensive depth” that extends into Syrian and Lebanese territory.
Israel’s war in Lebanon under guise of the ceasefire:
According to the Alma Institute Research Institute, Israel has carried out 613 raids in Lebanon during the ceasefire, 47.5% of the which were carried out south of the Litani River; 37.5% north of the Litani and 13% in the Bekaa. The strategic aim, Alma writes, is to limit the freedom of movement, destroy weapons & infrastructure, ‘create a sense of pursuit and penetration’, prevent rebuilding the contact line with Israel, and to push Hezbollah north of the Litani. A separate Israeli source claims that between the end of the ceasefire in Nov 2024, 344 Hezbollah fighters have been killed (if uninvolved individuals are included, this amounts to over 400 people killed)].
Abu Mazen appoints his successor — Hussein al-Sheikh — “at the request of the US” (Asharq al-Awsat):
President Mahmoud Abbas paved the way for his deputy, Hussein al-Sheikh, to assume the presidency until general elections are held ... in an attempt to ensure a smooth transition of power and prevent the emergence of alternative leaders or authorities. Sources familiar with the matter in Ramallah described the decision to Asharq Al-Awsat as “necessary” for several reasons, including the sensitivity and complexity of the current stage and to thwart any attempts to circumvent the PLO … President Abbas issued a constitutional declaration stipulating that if the position of President of the PNA becomes vacant, in the absence of the Legislative Council, the Vice-Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, the Vice-President of the State of Palestine, shall assume the duties of the presidency of the National Authority temporarily for a period not exceeding 90 days, during which free and direct elections will be held to elect a new president, in accordance with Palestinian election law. If it is impossible to hold the elections within that period due to force majeure, the period may be extended by a decision of the Palestinian Central Council for another period, but only once … Abbas did not explain the reasons for the decision at this time, while the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth said that it was taken at the request of the United States. President Abbas dissolved the Legislative Council, which was headed by Hamas, years ago.
(According to senior Israeli commentator Yoni Ben Menachem: “[Hussein Al-Sheikh] is an intelligent politician with connections in the US, Shin Bet, and COGAT … The Americans want someone who can continue with the peace plan in case Abu Mazen becomes incapacitated, so there was American pressure on this matter. In addition, Hussein Sheikh is close to Abu Mazen’s sons who are corrupt, and he is likely to support them in the future. It should also be noted that due to corruption allegations surrounding Sheikh, there is an American effort to boost his status”).
Yemen & Saudi De-Escalate (Al-Akhbar):
After receiving positive messages from Riyadh, Yemeni Deputy FM stressed the need for “the UN to advance the peace process and take concrete measures that contribute to building confidence and creating a suitable environment for achieving a just and comprehensive peace.” There are rumours of Oman resuming its mediation and subsequent Saudi leaks regarding the resumption of flights to Sana’a appear to be attempts to de-escalate tensions, particularly in light of the recent escalation that reached the point of Ansar Allah threatening military confrontation. Russia, which supports the UN peace efforts, also supports reconciliation efforts and reviving the peace process. FM Lavrov reiterated his country’s commitment to peace and stressed the need to launch a comprehensive national dialogue under the auspices of the United Nations to resolve the existing problems in Yemen.
Rival Saudi and UAE-backed armed groups deepen fragmentation in STC-controlled area (Al-Khaleej Online):
The formation of the new “Hadramawt Protection Forces” deepens Yemen’s fragmentation; over 10 semi-independent militias now operate outside the Defense Ministry, reflecting rival Saudi- and UAE-backed agendas and the sidelining of the official army. The “Hadramaut Protection Forces” are the latest product of the division plaguing the Yemeni scene in STC government-controlled areas, but they are not the first. Several armed factions and formations have previously been established outside the authority of the Ministry of Defense, which appears to be the least capable and well-equipped despite the significant support it has received from the coalition, specifically from Saudi Arabia … For some time, Hadramawt has been at the forefront of the complex and volatile political scene in Yemen, particularly in areas under the control of the Yemeni [STC] government — the largest and wealthiest governorate in terms of resources is witnessing significant tribal and political polarization, amidst a growing separatist movement demanding autonomy for the governorate, separate from the project of a unified state, or the secession advocated by the Southern Transitional Council. The more than 10 armed factions, varying in strength, capabilities, and supporters, are spread across several regions. They all operate under the banner of confronting the Houthi ‘coup’, but most of them have conflicting agendas that leave them in a state of paralysis. These formations are more widespread along the Yemeni coasts of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, as well as in the southern and eastern governorates, and along the Saudi border with Yemen.
