Two years on, Israel's wars are not completed ...
A compilation tracking consequential & strategic observations in West Asia -- analysis & reports from the Arabic/ regional press (11 Nov 2025)
Al-Akhbar: ‘Israel confronts a New Impasse on the Northern Front’ /
Hizbullah reaffirms its “legitimate right to resist” aggression by an enemy that imposes war and subjugation against Lebanon /
The Automated Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon /
‘Al-Sharaa regime is speed-dating — perhaps even towards the road of normalization with Israel’ /
Al-Sharaa’s ‘Old Jihadist Comrades’ Strike Back /
Sudan’s Fractures Again -- How RSF Control of El-Fasher Reshapes the State /
US escalates in Iraq; Aims to steer elections to exercise political control
CONSEQUENTIAL OBSERVATIONS & STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS
The US and Israel continue to impose their architecture of security, political and financial ‘Normalisation’ that aims to facilitate Israeli hegemony in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and the Gulf — at this stage, Saudi Arabia. In Lebanon, Hizbullah has responded with a defiant ‘open letter’ confirming that, unlike Israel, it has strictly abided by the ceasefire agreement of Nov 2024. The Party reaffirmed its “legitimate right to resist occupation and aggression, and to stand alongside [Lebanon’s] army defending the country”, and reaffirmed that “legitimate defense does not fall under the category of a “decision of peace” or a “decision of war”; rather, we exercise our right to defend against an enemy that imposes war upon our country … and seeks to subjugate our state”.
In Al-Akhbar, Ibrahim Al-Amine writes that “Israel now confronts a new impasse, an inability to complete the mission. Leaks aimed at shaping domestic public opinion prepare the ground for more wars, while domestic political rivalries within its core also push toward escalation ... Israel is advancing a narrative that the enemies have yet to surrender, and therefore a stronger blow is the only answer. But Israeli leaders refuse to admit the failure of their campaign [to date]”. Al-Amine warns of a strategic shift — “ … the collapse of [Israel’s] claimed ability to penetrate Hezbollah’s leadership, anticipate its thinking, and track its moves. That capability, once taken for granted, no longer exists. Israel is [now] confronting fundamental shifts in Hezbollah’s behavior”.
In Lebanon, US-Israeli rhetoric and attacks have intensified: On 7 Nov, Israel’s Channel 12 quoted an Israeli official saying: “If the Lebanese army does not disarm Hezbollah and fails to meet the demands of the ceasefire, Israel, with US backing, will attack Hezbollah targets across Lebanon, in including Beirut”. Israel’s KAN news has confirmed that recent airstrikes were carried out “in coordination with the Americans”, who have been stationed at Israel’s Northern Command base since the ceasefire took effect in November 2024. As a result of the continued attacks, Al-Jadeed reported that during the Lebanese cabinet session on Nov 6, Lebanon’s Army Commander Rudolphe Haykal proposed suspending the plan to disarm Hezbollah. Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad is leading efforts to a “non-escalation” track — managing Hezbollah’s weapons without triggering internal turmoil or confrontation with Israel - cautioning that military pressure is counterproductive and that setting deadlines for Hezbollah’s disarmament unrealistic. Egyptian officials have urged Washington to press Israel to halt assassinations of Hezbollah officials inside Lebanese cities, instead promoting a comprehensive plan backed by both domestic and international actors, calling for Israeli withdrawal from border areas, the removal of heavy weapons, and international support to strengthen the Lebanese army’s defensive capacity. Meanwhile, UNIFIL has begun implementing the UN Security Council’s decision to end its peacekeeping mission in southern Lebanon, ongoing since 1978.
In Syria, speaking at the Manama Dialogue, US Envoy Barrack said that “Al-Sharaa regime … is speed-dating … perhaps even towards the road of normalization with Israel”. He confirmed that Al-Sharaa’s US visit will be followed by a fifth round of direct US-mediated talks between Syria and Israel, aiming for a comprehensive border security arrangement by the end of 2025. Al-Sharaa has already accepted an earlier Israeli proposal dividing southern Syria into three zones: one covering Israeli-occupied areas since the fall of the former regime, including the strategic Mount Hermon summit; another demilitarised belt restricting Syrian forces; and a third zone controlling airspace, which prevents Syrian military flights—if any had remained—from reaching the Occupied Territories. Israel is already proceeding with its soft occupation of southern Syria — “The goal is to align the southern Syrian reality with Israel’s broader Zionist project through gradual military integration and attempts to normalize contact with local communities by both coercion and inducement”. Meanwhile, Al-Sharaa’s ‘old Jihadist comrades’ in idle have struck out against his attempts to start dismantling them — in the first armed confrontation, Al-Akhbar writes, “the results of the attack were far from favorable to al-Sharaa: militarily, his forces failed to subdue a relatively small group; politically, the confrontation exposed his weakness and eroded his credibility among fighters”.
In Iraq, the elections of 11 Nov are very significant for the US. Al-Akhbar writes that the US and Gulf states are now betting on PM Al-Sudani, hoping he can rally a strong parliamentary bloc, especially among Shia lawmakers. The main goal driving their support is disarming resistance factions -- US officials believe that if Sudani was to win, this could result in a new parliamentary majority willing to align with Washington. “This marks a clear US policy shift. US activity in Iraq is rising again, synchronized with its moves in Syria and Lebanon, and coordinated with Gulf states and Turkey. A clear sign came with the appointment of Mark Safaya, an Iraqi-born businessman and cannabis trader, as Trump’s Special Envoy to Iraq … Safaya stated his mission bluntly: in the coming period, the US will work to “rebuild Iraq with no place for paramilitary groups”. The [US] envoy’s presence signals a specific mission, not routine diplomacy: steering Iraq’s elections to exercise political control in Baghdad”. However, there has already been confrontation in the Shi’i bloc as PM Al-Sudani and Nouri al-Maliki have both maneuvered to claim leadership of the Shiite Coordination Framework before the 11 Nov elections. Maliki is allegedly mobilizing allies across sects to block Sudani’s second term and reassert dominance.
Turkish perspectives on the US’ strategic vision: Writing in Cumhuriyet, Muhammad Ali Güler, says that US Envoy Barrak’s statements mean that the US “wants Turkish-Israeli cooperation against Iran”, and that it “is working on a new system in the Middle East and wants Turkish-Israeli cooperation to be the basis of a front against Iran, with Azerbaijan, the Kurds in the countries where they reside, and the Arab tribes in Iraq and Syria, all under this umbrella.” Güler adds: “Barak is acting as if he is the American governor in the region extending from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean, and from Lebanon to the Gulf. At the heart of this new map are Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia, which, as Barak himself says, if they unite, will form the strongest region in the world”. He concludes by saying that, “Just as America used Turkey against Saddam and against Assad, it is now using it against Iran”.
In the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, İsmet Özçelik writes that Trump “instructed Barrack to implement the New Middle East plan”. America “is entrusting Turkey with the Caucasus, Syria, and Gaza. Trump and Barrack are taking turns praising Erdoğan. Turkey’s satisfaction with the American positions means that the plan is continuing, and even extending to the Eastern Mediterranean, where Lebanon and Cyprus have agreed on maritime borders, and preparations are underway for a quadrilateral conference between Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Libya”.
Israel confronts a New Impasse on the Northern Front (Ibrahim Al-Amine, Al-Akhbar):
Misreading the nature of the [Israeli] government risks a serious miscalculation, not only because it is an extremist camp, but because decision-making authority now operates firmly inside state institutions that design and execute policy, including the government, the army, and the security agencies … Two years into the genocide, Israel has been forced to reassess its security doctrine. But until it reaches clear conclusions, it defaults to familiar instruments, including advanced security operations, extensive intelligence capabilities, and large-scale bombardment. At the same time, Israel now carries the weight of global isolation. Diplomatic support alone can no longer conceal the deeper reputational damage … [and] becoming a liability … This matters because the political, economic, security, and moral environment surrounding Israel is weaker than at any other point in history. But Tel Aviv’s rulers insist that power is the only guarantor of survival and overlook a harsher truth, that their power has always been tied to its role as a Western colonial outpost. When Western priorities change, Israel absorbs the strain. After two years of war, the West has observed Israel’s failure to conclude any front despite widespread killing and destruction. In this context, planning for the northern front becomes clearer. Israel sees that front as a wide theater stretching from Lebanon to Syria, Iraq, and reaching Iran. It is a single interconnected arena that cannot be managed through isolated engagements and requires decisive strategic choices.
Messages conveyed to Lebanon through pragmatic intermediaries quoting Netanyahu and his military and security chiefs reveal an unspoken truth. Israel now confronts a new impasse, an inability to complete the mission. Leaks aimed at shaping domestic public opinion prepare the ground for more wars, while domestic political rivalries within its core also push toward escalation. Above all, Israel is advancing a narrative that the enemies have yet to surrender, and therefore a stronger blow is the only answer. But Israeli leaders refuse to admit the failure of their campaign. Recent developments in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran indicate that the gains once achieved through covert action have eroded. Even Israeli assessments now concede that the northern front has adapted and is rebuilding itself differently. And while Israeli society may not yet be ready to hold its leaders fully accountable, that does not mean the leaders are untouched … their external patrons are beginning to confront them over … strategic overreach. A senior envoy’s account of ceasefire diplomacy is illustrative. He said Trump asked his security advisers about the situation. He concluded that Israel seemed capable of nothing but more killing, and that mounting damage to US interests made intervention necessary ... Trump told Netanyahu to stop the fighting. That shift opened a potential new track for handling the Palestinian file ...
So, the central question remains, how can Israel tackle northern and eastern threats? Its answer habitually defaults to large-scale military and security campaigns. Force is its reflex. What has changed is not its willingness to escalate killing and destruction, that is now expected, but the collapse of its claimed ability to penetrate Hezbollah’s leadership, anticipate its thinking, and track its moves. That capability, once taken for granted, no longer exists. Israel is confronting fundamental shifts in Hezbollah’s behavior, including strategic patience and refusal to be baited into instant reactions. Still, the occupation is unwilling to tolerate risks that could precipitate a wide military campaign against Lebanon that might spill into Iraq and Iran. On our side, there is no alternative to full preparedness. If the enemy once succeeded in dividing our ranks and convincing factions to fight separately, our minimum duty now is to face it as a single front, whatever the sacrifices. (Ibrahim Al-Amine is editor of Al-Akhbar)
Hizbullah’s Open Letter: Reaffirms its “legitimate right to resist occupation & aggression”:
“ … Facts confirm that Lebanon and Hezbollah have implicitly and strictly abided by the content of the ceasefire declaration from the moment it was issued until today, the Zionist enemy has continued its violations of the declaration by land, sea, and air … disregarding all calls to cease its hostile actions. Instead, the enemy has exploited such calls to blackmail Lebanon, impose conditions, and evade halting its aggression—persisting in its project to subjugate Lebanon, humiliate its state, people, and army, and drag it into a political agreement that would force Lebanon to recognize the enemy’s interests in our country and the region … Although the hasty governmental decision regarding the “exclusivity of arms” was presented by some as a goodwill gesture toward the enemy and its protectors, the enemy exploited this governmental misstep to impose the disarmament of the resistance … as a precondition for halting hostilities —something not stipulated in the ceasefire declaration and can neither be accepted nor imposed. The issue of exclusive arms cannot be discussed in response to foreign demands or Israeli blackmail, but only within a national framework that produces a comprehensive strategy for defense, security, and the protection of national sovereignty … The Israeli enemy does not target Hezbollah alone; it targets Lebanon in all its components, and seeks to strip Lebanon of every means to reject the Zionist entity’s extortionist demands, imposing submission to its policies and interests in Lebanon and the region … As for becoming entangled in or sliding toward the proposed negotiation traps, such moves would only grant further gains to the Israeli enemy, which always takes and never abides by its commitments—indeed, it gives nothing. With such a savage enemy, backed by the American tyrant, no maneuver or cleverness can succeed. Lebanon’s responsibility today lies in enforcing the ceasefire declaration, and pressuring the Zionist enemy to comply with it—not in yielding to aggressive blackmail or being dragged into political negotiations with the Zionist enemy … We reaffirm our legitimate right to resist occupation and aggression, and to stand alongside our army and our people in defending the sovereignty of our country. Legitimate defense does not fall under the category of a “decision of peace” or a “decision of war”; rather, we exercise our right to defend against an enemy that imposes war upon our country, refuses to halt its assaults, and seeks to subjugate our state. Based on this vision, we approach current developments by reaffirming to all that the present moment calls for unity of effort to halt the Zionist violations, aggression, and escalation against our country, and to repel the security and existential dangers threatening it.
The Automated Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon (Mohanad Hage Ali and Mohamad Najem, Carnegie Middle East):
Israeli drones are taking on a variety of tasks, including killing people, searching bags, and guiding spies working on Israel’s behalf … In many ways, South Lebanon has become a testing ground for new drone system capabilities … The extensive use of drones has, in effect, shifted the dynamics of attrition, placing those on the receiving end of occupation at an even greater disadvantage. [Israel’s] 22-year occupation of South Lebanon [until] 2000, relying on ground forces backed by air superiority ... came at a high cost, with more than 900 Israeli soldiers killed. To reduce their losses, the Israelis formed the South Lebanon Army … made up of Lebanese auxiliaries, numbering around 3,000 combatants. Today’s remote occupation, using drones, is far less costly and has spared the Israeli military the perils of direct exposure on the battlefield.
Since the ceasefire, Israel has carried out daily attacks that have killed around 300 people, including more than 100 civilians. Many of these were drone strikes. Drones have also been conducting regular search operations in southern Lebanese towns ... In one reported incident, a drone stopped a car with tinted windows, ordering the driver to roll them down for inspection. In another, a local woman … was instructed by a drone to stop walking down the street so that her bag could be searched. Many of these encounters involve civilians, and appear intended to intimidate them and remind them that they are constantly being watched … [taking an emotional toll on the local population, which has to deal with incessant buzzing ... when a drone is nearby. As part of its collective intimidation tactics and psychological warfare, Israel has largely scrapped the traditional practice of dropping leaflets in favor of deploying drones equipped with powerful loudspeakers that transmit messages to residents of southern towns … The targeting of [one citizen] Mazraani is part of an apparent policy aimed at preventing more than 100,000 Lebanese from returning to their homes in the border region, signalling Israel’s interest in maintaining a depopulated buffer zone. The same objective has seen Israel use drones to thwart reconstruction ... Israeli drones such as the Hermes 450 and 900 can operate as airborne sensors that passively collect radio and network signals. This practice, known as signals intelligence (SIGINT), includes the harvesting of basic metadata from nearby devices and the interception of different frequencies and wavelengths such as WIFI, GPS, mobile network exchange, and pagers. The resulting trove of information can be used to map behavioral patterns and, through artificial intelligence, cross-checked against data that is already on hand. SIGINT can also support more advanced digital surveillance methods … [and] drones have also been deployed to assist human intelligence on the ground …
In sum, South Lebanon has become a theater of war in which drones are not merely instruments of assault but tools of surveillance, intimidation, and population control … Drones have transformed the nature of the occupation itself. What once required a permanent military presence and direct engagement is now executed remotely, with minimal risk to Israeli soldiers … Counter-insurgency and occupation have become automated.
Al-Sharaa’s “Old Comrades” Strike Back (Al-Akhbar):
[Last week] forces loyal to the Damascus Authorities surrounded a small camp in Idlib’s countryside, sheltering around 150 French fighters led by Omar Omsen … [It was] the first direct test between al-Sharaa in his new political guise and his “old brothers-in-arms” … Security services under al-Sharaa and HTS failed to isolate the French fighters … Omsen’s ties with the Turkistan Party date back to 2013, when he led Firqat al-Ghuraba, made up of European jihadists, mostly from France and Belgium. That group operated under the protection of the Turkistan Islamic Party for years … Many [foreign fighters] now believe [Al-Sharaa] is repeating the same tactic he used against Idlib’s local factions: isolating, coercing, or dismantling them one by one … [However] the results of the attack were far from favorable to al-Sharaa: militarily, his forces failed to subdue a relatively small group; politically, the confrontation exposed his weakness and eroded his credibility among fighters he has promised to control on behalf of regional and Western powers. He unintentionally united foreign factions against him, drew sympathy from ideological supporters, and failed to secure a decisive outcome …
Western officials have begun pressing al-Sharaa to publicly align with the “war on terror,” including through joint operations with the US-led coalition against ISIS and other militant groups [that are] now part of the Syrian security structure. Russia appears satisfied with his assurances to gradually “resolve” the issue of foreign fighters — particularly those of Russian origin. China, meanwhile, continues to raise concerns at the UN about Uyghur and Turkistani fighters in Syria. Beijing awaits the visit of FM Al-Shaibani later this month to assess how serious the Damascus Authorities are about eliminating this threat before deciding whether to support or obstruct efforts to lift UN sanctions on al-Sharaa … The crisis goes beyond diplomatic pressures. It exposes the weakness of [Al-Sharaa’s] ideological narrative among his own base.
Report: Negotiations between between Sanaa and Riyadh (Al-Akhbar):
Across Yemen, pressure is growing on the political leadership to push Riyadh to meet the demands of peace after waging an eight-year war that devastated the country. Early indications suggest that new negotiations have begun between Sanaa and Riyadh, with Oman once again serving as mediator. Among Yemenis, one question dominates discussions: What comes after the Gaza war? Many are asking what Saudi Arabia owes Yemen for its Operation Decisive Stormand the destruction it caused. What price should the Gulf states pay for their aggression and occupation of parts of Yemen? … The prevailing view in Sanaa is that Saudi Arabia must respond to these questions and show whether it is serious about peace. For most Yemenis, humanitarian and economic relief, prisoner exchanges, and lifting the blockade are essential confidence-building steps that could prepare the ground for a comprehensive settlement. Public opinion increasingly supports moving these issues forward through genuine political negotiations aimed at restoring Yemen’s sovereignty, unity, and independence over its entire territory without fragmentation or delay … For Saudi Arabia, avoiding the consequences of its failed war on Yemen through delay tactics, partial solutions, or temporary humanitarian gestures is no longer sustainable. With no strategic justification to prolong the situation, political and economic factors are now pushing Riyadh toward diplomacy … So far, Riyadh seems to be ignoring calls from Israeli right-wing figures who view Yemen as the next major threat after Gaza. Smotrich has publicly urged Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, to “eliminate the Houthi threat,” while outlets such as The Jerusalem Post, Washington Examiner, and National Review have advocated for Washington to re-empower Riyadh militarily to lead a “proxy war against Ansar Allah” following the failure of the Red Sea naval coalition.
Sudan’s fractures again -- How RSF control of El-Fasher reshapes the state (Abbas al-Zein, The Cradle):
The fall of El-Fasher signals the end of Sudan’s centralized governance and the rise of a militarized political economy fueled by gold, regional corridors, and foreign interests … El-Fasher had served for more than a century as the symbolic and administrative hub of the Sudanese state in Darfur. The RSF’s seizure of the city represents the collapse of Khartoum’s last stronghold in the region and the onset of what might be termed “forced decentralization” or a fragmentation of authority in which parallel power centers emerge, outside the bounds of the central state. El-Fasher links Darfur to West Africa, [now the] lifeline for the RSF’s war economy. With the RSF entrenched in Darfur and the army clinging to Sudan’s eastern and central regions, the country has effectively fractured … symbolically end[ing] Sudan’s post-independence model of centralized governance ... not through formal secession, but through the creation of parallel political economies that operate entirely outside Khartoum’s authority.
A crisis of Arabism: The Darfur war has also become a battlefield for Sudan’s contested Arab identity. Arab tribes ... are now caught between a central state that historically monopolized Arab identity and marginalized Arabs of the periphery; and non-Arab communities … fractur[ing] the very idea of Arabism in Sudan. No longer a unifying cultural identity, it now functions as a dividing line – between the Arabs of power and those of the margins … Darfur now resembles a patchwork of armed fiefdoms more than a tribal society. The collapse of traditional authority has paved the way for a new order where weapons, not elders, dictate the rules.
Darfur’s transformation into a militarized economic hub: The UAE, through Dubai-based companies, plays a central role in this shadow economy. It reportedly receives up to 90 percent of Sudan’s gold exports ... in exchange provides the RSF with arms, logistics, and financing. According to a 2025 Chatham House study, this gold-for-influence model has made Sudanese gold a currency of regional power. Through Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the RSF, it seeks to strengthen its regional influence as part of its plan to dominate ports in the West Asian region in general, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea in particular , and to secure strategic resources such as gold and other minerals, reinforcing its position in the regional struggle for resources. Cairo, meanwhile, views the RSF’s control of western Sudan as a threat to its southern security and the integrity of Nile water agreements. Egypt has thrown its support behind the Sudanese army, seeing the RSF’s rise as an existential risk to national cohesion and regional water politics. From this position, Cairo calibrates its political and military backing of the army against a broader imperative, preventing Sudan’s collapse from spilling chaos across its southern border.
What comes next? Three scenarios: Sudan’s war has entered a decisive phase, shaped by internal collapse and external exploitation … Three possible scenarios for Sudan’s future can be envisaged: One possible outcome is a de facto partition, where Sudan fractures into rival zones controlled by the RSF and army … A unified Sudan survives in name only. Another trajectory could involve escalated war. The RSF may push east to seize more resource-rich areas or even attempt a renewed assault on Khartoum … A third possibility is managed fragmentation. A regionally brokered arrangement may entrench the status quo, distributing power and resources between the warring factions without resolving the conflict. In all scenarios, the drivers remain the same: gold, trade routes, and the regional contest for influence.
“Amid the rubble of Khartoum, a country is being destroyed” (Ad-Diyyar):
In the devastated streets of Khartoum … the city that was once the center of decision-making and the economy has been transformed into silent ruins, while Sudan disappears from international headlines as if it were a country without a pulse. Since the outbreak of fighting in April 2023, Khartoum has not known a single day of peace … the situation in the Darfur region is even more brutal … State institutions are rapidly eroding. Banks are closed, schools have been turned into shelters, and the Army and the RSF are vying for control of cities without either side decisively winning ... As for the civilian government that Sudanese people dreamed of after the 2019 revolution, it has become a distant memory … Sudan is being killed silently, twice over — once by war, and again by indifference. While the world is preoccupied with news of major wars … Khartoum today is nothing more than a symbol of a bitter truth: that there are people dying without anyone noticing.
US escalates in Iraq: Aims to steer elections to exercise political control (Hussein Ibrahim, Al-Akhbar):
For years, Iraqi elections have been playing out as a non-military US-Iranian proxy showdown. The latest round, scheduled for Tuesday [11 Nov], is no exception. Washington recently hinted at US-Israeli airstrikes targeting Iraqi factions. But such attacks would not change the balance of power in Iraq and could even have the opposite effect … Economic sanctions were also waved around. Since all Iraqi oil revenues pass through a government account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the US could technically cripple Baghdad. These revenues represent 90% of the Iraqi government’s income. Yet that path risks backlash, as American contractors and oil giants like Chevron and ExxonMobil, that dominate Iraq’s energy sector, would suffer most. That’s why this election matters so much to Washington. The US and Gulf states are now betting on PM Al-Sudani, hoping he can rally a strong parliamentary bloc, especially among Shia lawmakers. The main goal driving this support is disarming resistance factions. US officials believe that if Sudani was to win, other blocs will follow suit, forming a new parliamentary majority willing to align with Washington.
This marks a clear US policy shift. US activity in Iraq is rising again, synchronized with its moves in Syria and Lebanon, and coordinated with Gulf states and Turkey. A clear sign came with the appointment of Mark Safaya, an Iraqi-born Chaldean businessman and cannabis trader, as Trump’s special envoy to Iraq. This choice fits Trump’s pattern of appointing businessmen with regional roots as envoys (as with Barrack for Syria and Lebanon). Safaya stated his mission bluntly: in the coming period, the US will work to “rebuild Iraq with no place for paramilitary groups”. The [US] envoy’s presence signals a specific mission, not routine diplomacy: steering Iraq’s elections to exercise political control in Baghdad. In effect, this means reversing the outcome of 2022, when the US tolerated the formation of a government seen as favorable to Iran — led by the very same Sudani, chosen by the pro-Iran “Coordination Framework” after confrontations with Muqtada al-Sadr that ended with Sadr’s complete withdrawal from political life. Back then, Washington accepted Sudani as a compromise to maintain stability amid the global oil crunch following the Ukraine war and the Saudi-Russian push within OPEC+. But after the Al-Aqsa Flood, Washington’s patience ran out.
The new strategy is far from guaranteed. Sudani’s support for disarmament and his ties to Washington have already drawn open criticism from Resistance factions. He faces powerful rivals within the Shia camp. And with Sadr now officially boycotting the elections, Sudani loses a major potential voter base, one that could have tilted in his favor if Sadr permitted his supporters to vote. Despite his pro-US leanings, Sudani has so far avoided confrontation with resistance groups and Iran. His approach has been persuasion, not pressure.
(Separately Al-Akhbar reports on the upcoming elections:
“Election expert Ali al-Aref told Al-Akhbar that “Iraq stands at a real crossroads. The upcoming elections will either restore public confidence in the political process or further entrench apathy and despair.” He adds that “the multitude of small lists and the absence of major blocs may make the next parliament more fragmented, complicating the process of forming a government later on.” However, he also believes that “the shift towards direct electronic counting and the presence of strict judicial oversight can give the process greater credibility than previous elections.” The most significant challenge, according to observers, lies in the expected voter turnout, as unofficial polls indicate that it may not exceed 35% of registered voters, particularly in the southern provinces, which are traditionally a stronghold of the Sadrist Movement”.
